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
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L. Buckmaster. 28th December 1819.

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VINDICATION

OF

CERTAIN PASSAGES

IN

THE COMMON ENGLISH VERSION

OF THE

NEW TESTAMENT.

ADDRESSED TO

GRANVILLE SHARP, ESQ.

AUTHOR OF THE

“Remarks on the uses of the Definitive Article in the Greek Text of the New Testament.”

✓ BY THE

REV. CALVIN WINSTANLEY, A. M.

==
CAMBRIDGE :

UNIVERSITY PRESS—HILLIARD AND METCALF

1819.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following tract being out of print in England, it was thought of sufficient value to be republished in this country. It is an able examination of an intricate subject, the discussion of which has excited considerable interest, and which is in itself of sufficient importance to require the attention of the theological student.

The remarks of Granville Sharp Esq. upon the Uses of the Definitive Article in the Greek Text of the New Testament first appeared in the Museum Oxoniense. Two editions of them were afterwards edited by Dr. Burgess, Bishop of St. David's, and they were regarded by some critics as affording to the Trinitarian an unanswerable argument in support of his creed. The following are the alterations which Mr. Sharp would introduce into the Received Version on the authority of the rules he advanced.

Acts xx, 28. (Adopting the reading *του Κυριου και Θεου*) he would translate "The church of him who is Lord and God."

Ephes. v, 5. "In the kingdom of Christ our God."

2 Thess. i, 12. "According to the grace of Jesus Christ our God and Lord."

1 Tim. v, 21. }
2 Tim. iv, 1. } "Before Jesus Christ, our God and Lord."

Titus ii, 13. "The glorious appearing of Jesus Christ, our great God and Saviour."

2 Peter i, 1. "Of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ."

Jude 4. "Our only master Jesus Christ, both God and Lord."

No alteration has been made from the English edition of Mr. Winstanley's Vindication of the common version of these texts, except the correction of numerous typographical errors. An appendix has been added by a friend of the editor, containing some remarks upon Middleton's Treatise on the Greek Article, and such extracts from the notice of that work which appeared in the Monthly Review for May and June 1810, as were thought applicable to the subject.

THE HISTORY OF THE

REIGN OF KING CHARLES THE FIRST

BY JOHN BURNET

IN TWO VOLUMES

LONDON, Printed by J. Streater, at the Sign of the Gun, in St. Dunstons Church-yard, 1680.

THE FIRST VOLUME

THE SECOND VOLUME

THE THIRD VOLUME

THE FOURTH VOLUME

THE FIFTH VOLUME

THE SIXTH VOLUME

THE SEVENTH VOLUME

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THE THIRTIETH VOLUME

VINDICATION, &c.

SIR,

WHEN I first perused your Remarks on the uses of the definitive article in the Greek text of the New Testament, I confess, I did not see them in that imposing light in which they have since been recommended to public attention. The tract appeared to my judgment to be defective in several particulars; but my opinion of it was, for a time, considerably affected by reading afterwards the strong and unqualified language of your learned editor, the present Bishop of St. David's. I determined, therefore, to bestow upon it as minute and careful an examination as I was capable of, that I might not be led into error, either by a veneration for great names, or by, what is not less common nor less natural, a secret spirit of opposition to magisterial decisions on subjects incapable of demonstration.

The following observations have lain by me for a considerable time, owing to causes which it is not necessary to state; I only mention this circumstance as affording some presumption that they have not been hastily prepared for the press, as I have had time enough to revolve and review them; and that I may, without arrogance, propose them to your candid reflection, as sufficient to convince you, notwithstanding the acknowledged authority of your learned editor, that you have not "decidedly applied a rule of construction to the correction of the common English version of the New Testament;" that there exists no necessity for correcting that version according to your rule; and that it does not "conceal from the English reader any thing discoverable in the original."

In saying this, I incur the danger, it seems, of being thought *a partial reader, unacquainted with the Greek language, or even blinded by unhappy prejudices*, if I do not expose myself to the imputation of Socinianism. But if you will peruse my remarks with patience to the end, though you may not acquit me of the involuntary imperfections of error and ignorance, you will, I am persuaded, not seriously charge me with wilful perversion of the sacred writings: οὐ γὰρ σπεινὸν νικῆσαι κακῶς, ἀλλὰ ζῆτῆσαι ἀληθῆς.

Be this as it may, the question between us is simply concerning the accuracy and fidelity of the common English version in those particular passages, which, you insist, ought to be corrected; and which, I think, need no such correction. To defend them as they now stand, all doctrinal inferences for the present being kept apart, should not be regarded as a useless labour, when it is considered, that your censures tend to bring that version into disrepute, after it has been read so long by authority in our churches, and been used with confidence and veneration by a numerous body of unlettered Christians. Some inconvenience, not to say some danger, might be apprehended from admitting alterations into it, or even from publicly proposing them as necessary; and, therefore, they ought to be rejected, until their necessity be proved by incontestible evidence. Whether you have yet done this will appear in the sequel.

But before your rules are examined, it will not be improper to take some notice of a principle of interpretation advanced by your learned editor, namely, that in all remote and written testimony the weight of evidence must ultimately depend upon the grammatical analogy of the language in which it is recorded. Admitting this to be true, for it is indisputable, yet if applied, as it seems intended to be, to the examination of separate passages, uncompar'd with, and uncontrolled by, other passages of similar import in the same author, it will sometimes disappoint the student. Such passages, if the grammatical construction alone be considered, may be ambiguous, and, by themselves, afford no satisfactory evidence. They want illustration and solution; and the cardinal question is, Whence is this solution to be sought? Not ultimately from critics and commentators, not from versions, nor yet from Greek and Latin fathers. The learned Beza may be confronted with the no less learned Erasmus, the former versions with the present, and to the opinion of the fathers may be opposed direct exceptions to your principal rule: so that we are driven at last to that source of illustration, which ought never to be rejected, except in cases of extreme necessity. If the sacred writers have expressed themselves ambiguously in some instances, and on the same subject clearly in others, and still more in a great plurality of others, we are bound, in exclusion of every extraneous authority, to consult them as their own best interpreters; *οὐ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι.*

Should this appear to be the real state of all the passages adduced for a corrected version, our common version may be satisfactorily defended. This is all I undertake to do; and for this purpose we may now proceed to the discussion of your rules. They are here transcribed for the sake of more convenient reference.

RULE I. When two personal nouns of the same case are connected by the copulative *καί*, if the former has the definitive article, and the latter has not, they both relate to the same person.

RULE II. If both nouns have the article, but not the copulative, they relate to the same person.

RULE III. If the first has the article and the second has not, and there is no copulative, they relate also to the same person.

RULE IV. If the nouns are not personal, they relate to different things or qualities.

RULE V. If personal nouns of the same case are connected by the copulative, and the first has not the article, they relate to different persons.

RULE VI. If they are connected by the copulative, and both have the article, they relate also to different persons.

In this discussion I shall observe the following method :

First, I shall point out some sources of error common to all your rules.

Secondly, I shall consider a class of exceptions which are not repugnant to the conclusion you would establish.

Thirdly, I shall produce such exceptions as are inconsistent with that conclusion.

Fourthly, I shall offer some remarks on the Syntax of the definitive article, and the copulative.

Lastly, I shall examine the passages of Scripture, which are the objects of this investigation.

These rules are all founded on the presence or the absence of the copulative or the article ; and nothing can be more imperfect than such rules. Both the copulative and the article are frequently suppressed by authors, and must be supplied by the reader's understanding. As this can only be done by attending to the context, and sometimes to the signification of the words employed, so far is the construction (the presence or absence of the copulative, for instance,) from being always the sole guide to the sense, that an apprehension of the sense must frequently precede our knowledge of the construction ; as when we have to determine, whether two personal nouns of the same case, gender, &c. in immediate connexion,

are in concord or apposition, and, therefore, relating to the same person, or not. Thus, according to your second and third rules taken together, and compared with your examples, personal nouns connected without the copulative denote the same person. If you mean nouns in concord or apposition, you beg the question, and nobody will oppose you ; but if you mean simply nouns so arranged in the same sentence, your rules are false : and that such is your meaning is evident from your excepting nouns impersonal only, or genitives depending on each other in succession. I will transcribe two of your examples, followed by two more of a different kind, but constructed in the same manner.

και ηγαλλιασε το πνευμα μου επι τῷ θεῷ τῷ σωτηρι μου.

This example is intended to confirm your second rule. The next is to serve the same purpose under your third ; but they prove nothing but that nouns in apposition denote the same person or thing.

Παυλος, δουλός θεου, αποστόλος δι Ιησου.

But now let us compare these that follow.

τις ἡ των τοσούτων ενώσεις, και διαιρέσεις ενουμένων, του πνευματος, του παιδος, του πατρος.—*Athenag. Leg.* 49.

εαν μη αναγεννηθῃτε ὕδατι ζῶντι, εἰς ὄνομα πατρος, υἱου, ἁγίου πνευματος, ου μη εἰσελθῃτε εἰς τὴν βασιλειαν των ουρανων.—*Clementina*, 698.

Here are nouns personal, constructed according to your rules, and genitive cases too, not depending on each other, yet plain exceptions. They are instances of the copulative suppressed, according to the figure called *asyndeton*, and very common with Greek writers, when several similar words are used in succession. You must have read of such a figure, though you must as certainly have forgotten it ; for some of your examples adduced in confirmation of your rules are only instances of it ; and your fourth rule is nothing else. *If the nouns* (connected without the copulative) *are not personal, they relate to different things or qualities.* This is your fourth rule, and here is your example :

χαρις, ελεος, ειρηνη απο θεου πατρος ἡμων.

The copulative is here suppressed, and might as well have been so with nouns personal ; or it might have been used in either case, without any difference of signification. So little is to be inferred from the omission of the copulative, without attention to the known sense of the words employed.

Nothing, again, can be more fallacious than the manner in which you have arrived at the formation of your rules ; which is evidently by inferring a general rule of interpretation from a prevailing mode of construction. Thus, having never found, that, when the same

person is meant by nouns joined by the copulative, the article is repeated before the second noun; you infer that whenever the article is not so repeated, the same person is meant. Let us then compare two examples from *Aristotle's Ethics* :

ὁ δὲ χαριεὶς καὶ ἐλευθερὸς οὕτως ἐξεί.

This example agrees with your first rule, and would be considered by you as some confirmation of it; but take the other :

περὶ ἃς (ἀπολαύσεις) λεγόμεν τὸν σῶφρονα καὶ ἀκολάστον.

This is a plain exception to your rule; and is known to be so, not from the context, nor the construction, but from the signification of the nouns themselves, which cannot be understood of the same person; so that we must have recourse to a principle of interpretation distinct from any mentioned by you, namely, a regard to the sense of the nouns employed. Simple, and almost trifling, as all this may appear, yet it deserves to be repeated; for if you were to add this principle as a limitation of your grand rule, by saying, *the nouns relate to the same person, except where their signification forbids it*, all your criticisms would avail little, and you would be obliged to examine the New Testament upon more enlarged and liberal grounds than you have taken.

To any rules founded on the use of the copulative, or article, or both, and directing us to understand two persons to be intended, there is a whole class of exceptions, which, as they do not affect your final conclusion one way or other, should be brought together, and set aside to prevent embarrassment; I allude to nouns used as predicates of a proposition.

The predicate of a proposition is thus constructed in Greek. Of an inconvertible proposition the predicate never takes the article; as,

ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθεριος· ὁ δὲ ἐλευθεριος οὐδὲν μάλλον μεγαλοπρεπής.—*Arist.*

And, therefore, (excepting proper names, or pronouns having the force of proper names) when two nouns are joined by a verb, one having the article, and the other not, that which has the article is the subject, the other the predicate, as,

Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος.

Though too much stress may have been laid on the omission of the article before Θεός; yet that omission is by no means insignificant. It serves, according to the Greek idiom, to exhibit the noun Θεός as an attribute of the Logos; not as an equivalent appellation that might be substituted for it. In this sense the Greek fathers understood it, as is evident from their using the noun Θεός as an adjective in allusion to this passage; the expression ὁ Θεός λόγος being familiar to

them. The common version is inferior in precision to the original; nor could it be otherwise, the English noun *God* not admitting the distinction preserved in the Greek. But if the word *Deity* were substituted, the translation would approach as near to the precision of the original, as the language would admit, as thus:

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with the Deity, and the word was Deity.

Of a similar kind is the much contested text of St. Peter, *βεβαιότερον εχομεν τον προφητικον λογον*, which Sherlock has rendered differently, as he confesses, from all the Greek expositors, and inconsistently with the construction. *Βεβαιότερον* must be the predicate, and the whole passage does not necessarily signify more than this, *We have the prophetic word more sure*, or, *it is more sure to us*: whether in its own nature, or in consequence of the transfiguration and its attendant circumstances, this is not the place to enquire. The above use of the verb *εχω*, as well as of its corresponding verb *habeo*, to connect a predicate to its subject is not uncommon, as in Origen's comment on this passage from the 54th Psalm.

Ιδου γαρ ο θεος βοηθει μοι, και ο κυριος αντιληπτωρ της ψυχης μου.

The comment is this:

Βοηθον δε εχειν ομολογει τον πατερα, και κυριον αντιλαμβανομενον της ψυχης αυτου, ινα ειπη τον υιον.

He confesses that he has the father his helper—that the father is his helper, &c. where it is remarkable that Origen does not repeat the article before *κυριον*, though it is repeated in the text.

Of a convertible proposition (that is when the predicate is equally comprehensive with the subject) both the subject and predicate have the article, or are both without it, as

ωστε δηλον, οτι και ο δικαιος εστι ο τε νομιμος και ο ισος.—Arist.

The words *ο δικαιος*, *ο νομιμος*, *ο ισος*, are all convertible terms in the philosophy of Aristotle, and may be substituted one for another.

ο ζων αρετος ο υπο του πατρος δοθεις ο υιος εστιν.—Origen.

και η αμαρτια εστι η παρονομια.

On this passage, Pearson has somewhere remarked, that the two nouns are constructed as perfectly convertible, as if there could be no sin, where there was no transgression of law.

η τροφη των φοβουμενων τον κυριον η σοφια εστι του θεου.

αρχη γαρ σοφιας φοβος κυριου.—Origen.

Now two or more nouns may be connected as predicates of the same subject, and, therefore, as relating to the same person in every form of construction, with or without, either copulatives, or articles.

παντα γαρ ο θεος εστιν αυτος ανθρωπος, φως απροσιτον, κοσμος τελειος, πνευμα, δυναμις, λογος.—Athenag. Leg. 61.

You would regard this example as a confirmation of one of your rules, though it is nothing to the purpose. There is no copulative; but there might have been four, as in the next;

ουκ εστι μου αξιος, λεγει, του ειναι υιος Θεου, και μαθητης Θεου, ὁμου και φιλος και συγγενης.—*Clem. Alex.*

αρχιερεως γαρ των προσφορων ἡμων, και προς τον πατερα παρακλητος εστι ὁ υιος του Θεου.—*Origen.*

ου δαιμων ὁ τους τοιουσδε επιτρεψας προς τον Θεον, αλλα Θεος λογος, και Θεου παις.—*Origen.*

βοηθος μου και αντιληπτωρ μου ει συ.—*Psalm.*

ισχυς μου και αντιληπτωρ μου ὁ κυριος.—*Psalm.*

συ ει αυτος ὁ βασιλευς μου, και ὁ Θεος μου.—*Psalm.*

You have adduced some passages of the same kind, as exceptions to your fifth, and sixth rules, as

Εγω ειμι το Α και το Ω, αρχη και τελος.

τον οφιν τον αρχαιον, ὃς εστι διαβολος και σατανας.

These (latter) you say, are two different names or appellatives, attributed (by the explanatory words ὃς εστι) to the same old serpent. That is, they are predicates of the same proposition. So far your distinction is sufficiently correct: but you have not always been equally circumspect; for under your third rule, according to which, *The omission of the copulative between two or more nouns (of the same case) even without the article before the second noun, will denote the same person*, you give this example,

πειποιτας τε σιαυτον ὁδηγον ειναι τυφλων, φως των εν σκοτει, παιδευτην αφρωνων, διδασκαλον νηπιων, κ. τ. λ.

The nouns, ὁδηγον, φως, &c. are certainly descriptive of the same person; not, as you think, because the copulative is omitted; but because they are predicates of the same indirect proposition; and would have equally described the same person, had the copulative been used, as it might have been, as before;

ουκ εστι μου αξιος, του ειναι υιος Θεου, και μαθητης Θεου.

ὅτι ψευσης εστι και ὁ πατηρ αυτου.

ἡξει Θεου υιος, των ὁσιων κριτης, και των αδικων κολασης.—*Origen.*

I have added this last example, for the sake of observing, that the verb substantiv: is implied, and must be understood: *The son of God will come (to be) the judge of the holy, &c.* The same remark is applicable to these examples that follow, and many more:

εις ὃ ετεθην κηρυξ και αποστολος και διδασκαλος εθνων.

ὅτι και κυριον και χριστον αυτον ὁ Θεος επωησεν.

τουτον ὁ Θεος αρχηγον και σωτηρα ὑψωσε τη δεξιᾳ αυτου.

It is upon this occasion, that you bring in your Fourth Rule, namely, *Yet it is otherwise, when the nouns are not of personal description or application ; for then they denote distinct things or qualities, as*

χαρις, ελεος, ειρηνη απο Θεου πατρος ἡμων.

But these nouns are so many subjects of a sentence, divisible into as many sentences, the copulative being suppressed ; had they been predicates, they might have described the same person, or thing, as

παντα γαρ ὁ Θεος εστι αυτος αυτω, φως απροσιτον, κοσμος τελειος, πνευμα, δυναμις, λογος.—*Athenag. Leg.*

Or with the copulative,

ισχυς μου και ὑμνησις μου ὁ κυριος.

The nouns *ισχυς* and *ὑμνησις*, separated from the context, are certainly names of different things ; but here they are descriptive of one person ὁ κυριος, as much as nouns personal would be ; as for instance, βοηθος και αντιληπτωρ in a former example.

παριδωκεν αυτον υπερ ἡμων προσφοραν και θυσιαν τω Θεω.

And now, SIR, having collected, in order to set aside, that class of exceptions, which would otherwise only perplex and embarrass our enquiry, I shall proceed to examine your several Rules in their order, and prove them to be some defective, some fallacious, and others absolutely false.

RULE I. When two personal nouns of the same case are connected by the copulative *και*, if the former has the definitive article, and the latter has not, they both relate to the same person, as

ὁ Θεος και πατηρ——ὁ κυριος και σωτηρ.

This rule is generally true ; but it is defective, inasmuch as it is liable to exceptions, which, if taken together, and fairly considered, must be fatal to the inference you would deduce from it. Nouns not personal are excluded by the terms of the rule : and your acknowledged exceptions are of plurals, and proper names. I add, 1st, That national appellations must be excepted, as

ὁ Μωαβιτης και Αμμανιτης.—*Origen de Orat.* 229.

2d, If one of the nouns be a plural.

περι του Ιησου και χριστιανων.—*Origen.*

εις τας Αθηνas εξεπεμφε συν τη μητρι και δουλους. *Clementina*, 718.

3d, If one of the nouns be impersonal.

μιτα του αξιοπρεπεστατου επισκοπου ἡμων, και αξιοπλοκου πνευματικου τεφανου του πρεσβυτεριου ἡμων.—*Ignat. epist.* 21.

Λοπαζομαι τον αξιοθεατον επισκοπον, και θεοπρεπισατον πρεσβυτεριον.

4th, If one of them be a proper name.

οι πεισι εικονα εχουσι του αρχοντος θεου πατρος, και Ιησου Χριστου.—

Ignat. ad Magn.

εν θεληματι του πατρος, και Ιησου Χριστου του θεου ημων.—*Ignat. ad Ephes.*

5th, When the signification of the nouns renders any farther mark of personal distinction unnecessary.

περι ως (απολαυσεις) λεγομεν τον σωφρονα και ακολασον.—*Arist. Ethic.*

του γαρ εγκρατους και ακρατους τον λογον επαινουμεν.—*Id.*

ποτερον ο εγκρατης και ακρατης εισι τω περι α, η τω πως, εχοντες την διαφοραν.—*Id.*

ο δ' αγαθος και κακος ηκιστα διαδηλοι καθ' υπνον.—*Id.*

η του ελευθερου παιδια διαφερει της του ανδραποδωνος, και αυ του πιπαι-
δευμενου και απαιδευτου.—*Id.*

εν τω γαρ εχειν μεν, μη χρησηται δε, διαφερουσιν οραμεν την εξιν· ως τε και
εχειν πως και μη εχειν· οιον τον καθευδοντα, και μαινομενον, και οινωμενον.—*Id.*

και δια τουτ' εις ταυτο τον ακρατη και ακολασον τιθεμεν, και εγκρατη και
σωφρονα.—*Id.*

In all the above-cited passages from Aristotle, the nouns, though personal, are used in a general or universal sense. In this respect, it must be confessed, they differ materially from those of which you would correct the common version; and so far may be thought inapplicable to our present purpose. But they are not totally inapplicable; as they prove, that when the signification of the nouns renders any farther precaution unnecessary, the second article may be omitted, without confounding the distinction of persons. They prove also that the article may be understood after the copulative; for the same author as frequently repeats it with similar nouns, as,

ετα περι ποια τον ακρατη και τον εγκρατη θετειν.

And sometimes he omits it altogether, and in the same sense, as,

ο αυτος λογος και περι οινωμενου και καθευδοντες.

ο μεν ουν Περσων η Ρωμαίων βσιλειως σατραπης και υπεροχος, η στρατη-
γος. κ. τ. λ.—*Cels. apud Orig.*

I shall now subjoin several quotations, which come within all the limitations of your first rule, and are direct exceptions to it.

Clemens Alexandrinus has this quotation from Plato:

τον παντων θεον αιτιον και τε ηγεμονος και αιτις πατερα κυριον επομυνετας.

Here του ηγεμονος και αιτιου is an agreement with your rule, but

τον παντων Θεον—και πατερα κυριον is in direct opposition to it. Origen has the same quotation with some difference, but still without the repetition of the article before πατερα, thus,

και τον των παντων Θεον, ηγεμονα των τε οντων και των μελλοντων, του τε ηγεμονος και αιτιου πατερα και κυριον επομνυντας.

Clemens observes, that Plato appears to be describing the Father and the Son ; φαινεται πατερα και υιον εμφανων ; and Origen makes a similar observation : so that neither of these Greek fathers thought the repetition of the article so necessary to distinguish two persons. It may be remarked also, by the way, that where Clemens writes πατερα κυριον, Origen writes πατερα και κυριον, for one person ; which is an exception to your fifth rule.

τω Θεω των όλων προσεχετε και διδασκαλω των περι αυτου μαθηματων τω Ιησου.—*Orig. contra Cels.* 497.

This is surely a pertinent example. The attribute διδασκαλος without the article repeated, must be referred, not to the preceding ο Θεος, but to the following ο Ιησους as a distinct subject ; and in the same manner may five of your examples be understood. If you should object, that the article, though not prefixed to διδασκαλος is to Ιησους, it may be replied, that it is not there a mark of difference, but of identity with διδασκαλος, and being prefixed to a proper name might as well have been omitted. That it is not, in such a situation, a mark of personal distinction, might be shown in many instances, such as these,

λεγει δε ο κυριος ημων και σωτηρ Ιησους ο Χριστος εν ευαγγελισις.—*Const. Apost.* 258.

τον κοινον ημων Θεον και κυριον τον χριστον.—*See Sharp*, 110.

τω δε Θεω πατρι, και υιω τω κυριω ημων Ιησου Χριστω συν τω αγιω πνευματι δοξα.—*See note in Burgh's Enquiry*, 359.

In this example, as well as in the one last cited from Origen, the article is not repeated immediately after the copulative, and is so far an exception to your rule. If it be objected, that it is afterwards repeated, I reply, as before, that in such a situation it is a mark of identity with the noun immediately preceding. Besides, if you should think it any thing more, you must give up one of your own examples, namely,

Διαμαρτυρομαι ουν εγω ενωπιον του Θεου και κυριου Ιησου Χριστου ΤΟΥ μελλοντος κρινειν ζωντας και νεκρους.

γινεται δη ουν τα παντα του ανθρωπου, οτι τα παντα του Θεου και κοινα αιφειν τοις φιλοις τα παντα, του Θεου και ανθρωπου.—*Clem. Alexand.* 76.

If any objection should be made to this example, it must be, that the last noun, *ανθρωπος*, (by which the author means a pious Christian) is used in a general sense. It is, however, a farther proof that the repetition of the article is not so necessary, as you have supposed. The reason why it is omitted in this particular instance, I shall consider hereafter; for the present I shall produce some examples, to which no objection can be imagined.

μεθ' οὗ δοξα τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι. *Epist. Eccles. Smyrn. de Martyr. Polycarp.*

φοβου τον θεον, υἱε, καὶ βασιλεια, καὶ μηθ' ἑτερω αυτων απειθησης — *Param. cap. 24, v. 21.*

This passage from the Septuagint, which I am surprised you should have overlooked, is thus quoted, in the interpolated epistle of Ignatius to the Smyrneans :

τιμα, φησιν, υἱε, τον θεον καὶ βασιλεια.

It would be unnecessary to examine the rest of your rules, if you had not proposed them as confirmations of the first : but this being the case, some notice must be taken of them ; and it shall be as short as I can make it.

Your second rule is, *that when both the nouns have the article but not the copulative, they relate to the same person.*

I call this a fallacious rule, because, if by the copulative omitted, you mean *neither expressed nor understood*, the rule is indeed true ; but then it is no more than a common rule of concord, and of much less importance, than you intended it should appear. It is founded on the manner in which an attribute is connected in Greek to its subject ; which is, by prefixing the article to the attribute, wherever the latter is placed. One of your examples, and they are all alike, is, *τον ποιμενα τον μεγαν*, *the great shepherd*, which may be thus expressed, *ὁ μεγας ποιμην—ποιμην ὁ μεγας—οὐ ὁ ποιμην ὁ μεγας*. This last form of construction is the foundation of your rule. But if from hence you would infer that the mere omission of the copulative between such nouns, shows them to relate to the same person, your rule is false ; as for instance,

των Σιϋλλων το πληθος, ἡ Σαμια, ἡ Κολοφωνια, ἡ Κυμαια, ἡ κ. τ. λ.—*Clem. Alexand.*

τις ἡ των τοσουτων ἑνωσις, καὶ διαίρεσις ἐνουμενων, του πνευματος, του παιδος, του πατρος.—*Athenag. Leg. 49.*

Your third rule is, *that the omission of the copulative between two or more nouns (of the same case) of personal description, even without the ar-*

article before the second noun, will have the same effect ; namely, will denote the same person.

This rule is no more than an extension of the former, and equally fallacious, and for the same reason. If you mean, when *the copulative is neither expressed nor understood*, you have only given a common rule of concord, or apposition : if you mean any thing more, your rule is false. Your first example is nothing to the purpose, the several nouns being predicates of a proposition ; and for that reason only are descriptive of the same person ; not, as you suppose, because the copulative is omitted, for it might as well have been inserted, *πεποιθας τε σεαυτον ὁδηγον ειναι τυφλων, φως των εν σκοτει, παιδευτην αφρονων, διδασκαλον νηπιων. κ. τ. λ.* St. Paul might have written, *και φως, και παιδευτην, και διδασκαλον*, without any difference of signification.

Your following rules are instances of concord or apposition, and are known to be so, not from the omission of the copulative, but from that, and the signification of the nouns, taken together ; as will appear from the subjoined examples, which are direct exceptions to your rule :

Διακονος αφοριζει υποδιακονον, αναγνωσην, ψαλτην, διακονισσαν. κ. τ. λ.
—*Constit. Apost. l. 8.*

εαν μη αναγεννηθητε ὑδατι ζωντι, εις ονομα πατρος, υιου, ἁγιου πνευματος, ου μη εισελθητε εις την βασιλειαν των ουρανων.—*Clementina, 698.*

ὅπου ουκ ἐνι Ἕλλην και Ιουδαιος, περιτομη και ακροβυστια, βαρβαρος, Σκυθης, δουλος, ελευθερος.—*St. Paul.*

εν ταυταις κατεκειτο πληθος πολυ των αθθενουντων, τυφλων, χολων, ξηρων, εκδιχομενων την του ὕδατος κινησιν.—*St. John.*

Your fourth rule, relating to nouns not personal, may be passed over. It is sufficient to repeat, that it is founded on the construction called *asyndeton*. Let us proceed to the fifth ; viz. *When there is no article before the first noun, the insertion of the copulative before the next noun, or name, of the same case, denotes a different person or thing from the first.*

This rule, as it relates to things expressed by more than two nouns, is only the fourth rule with the ellipsis of the copulative supplied. In your first example, all the copulatives might have been omitted. I ought to have observed before, that the *asyndeton* never takes place, unless there be more than two nouns ; thus we have *χαρις ὑμιν και ειρηνη απο θιου πατρος*, where the copulative could not be omitted ; *χαρις, ελεις, ειρηνη απο θιου πατρος*, with the copulative understood. If, therefore, you had restricted your second and third

rules, to two nouns only, they would have been true ; that is, they would have been rules of concord ; but that was evidently short of your intention : besides the concord may be carried through several nouns.

But this fifth rule, as it relates to persons, is utterly false ; nouns constructed according to it, may relate to the same, or to different persons. Of different persons you have given examples ; my business is to adduce some, where the same person is described.

οὐ γὰρ εἰν—ἀδικούντα, καὶ ἐπιορκούντα, καὶ ψευδομένον, δυνάμιν βεβαίαν κτησασθαι.—*Demost.*

ευχαριζώμεν δὲ ὡς θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ καὶ κυρίῳ.—*Origen.*

ευχεσθαι ἡμᾶς οὐ δεῖ, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρχιερέως καὶ παρακλητοῦ δυνάμενον συμπάθειν ταῖς ἀσθενείαις ἡμῶν.—*Origen.*

πίστευσον ἀνθρώπε ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ θεῷ· πίστευσον ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ παθόντι καὶ προσκυνοῦντι θεῷ ζῶντι.—*Clem. Alex. 66.*

παράβολον κυρίου τίς νοήσει, εἰ μὴ σοφὸς καὶ ἐπιστήμων, καὶ ἀγαπῶν τὸν κύριον αὐτοῦ.—*Clem. Alex. 578.*

Your exception is, “when the numerical adjective *εἰς* precedes the first noun ; in which case the copulative *καὶ* will have the same effect that it has between two nouns where only the first is preceded by the article, agreeably to the first rule ;” as, *Ἐἰς θεὸς καὶ πατήρ.*

It is true that it will have the same effect ; that is, it will generally denote the same person, but not always ; as,

ἡμεῖς οὖν, ὡ ἐπισκοποὶ, εἰς ἓνα πατέρα, καὶ υἱόν, καὶ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, τρίτον βαπτισατέ.—*Constit. Apost.*

Your sixth rule is, *If both the nouns, connected by the copulative, have the article, they relate to different persons.*

There is no more truth in this rule than in the preceding one. You should have said, the nouns are distinct appellations, or attributes, generally of different persons, but sometimes of the same person. You have, in part, acknowledged this, by saying, “except distinct and different *actions* are intended to be attributed to one and the same person, that is, as far as may be discovered by the context.” But there frequently occur passages, in which neither the context, nor the grammatical construction, nor any thing present, without a previous acquaintance with the usual application of the terms, can enable us to determine whether one person, or two, be intended ; as,

ὁ δὲ ὁμολογούμενος ὑπο τοῦ πατρὸς κτισθεὶς πρωτοτοκόν, καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, συνίσταται διὰ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁμολογίας τῇ ἐν οὐρανοῖς πατρὶ.—*Origen.*

No reader unacquainted with the language of the Greek Testament, or of ecclesiastical writers, could possibly discover whether the above genitives were appellations of one person, or of two. It would be difficult to show, why the like previous knowledge must be abandoned during our attempts to interpret passages constructed according to your first rule; in order to determine whether they must, or must not, be considered as exceptions to it. I add several more exceptions to the last, or sixth rule.

που ουν ειν ε εν τοις προφηταις λεγων, και ο τερασια πεποιηκως.—*Origen.*

οπερ ην ο μονογενης του θεου, και ο πρωτοτοκος πασης κτισεως.—*Origen.*

ινα—ο θεος δοξαζεται, και ο μονος αγαθος και ο μονος σωτηρ δι' υιου εξ αιωνος εις αιωνα επιγινωσκηται.—*Clem. Alex. 723.*

ει ουν ο κυριος ημων, και ο διδασκαλος, ουτως εταπεινωσεν εαυτον.—*Const. Apost. 290.*

και εξορκιζω σε κυριον τον θεον του ουρανου, και τον θεον της γης.—*Gen.*

ο θεος Αβρααμ και ο θεος Ναχωρ κρινει ανα μεσον ημων.—*Gen.*

I should now proceed to the immediate consideration of the several passages of Scripture in question, if I had not thought that the following observations on the use of the prepositive article, and the copulative, might contribute to the elucidation of the subject. Some of them will contain nothing but what must be familiar to most readers of Greek; but others I have reason to regard in a different light, having never met with them in any grammatical treatise: and all of them may convey information to those who have not paid particular attention to this portion of the Greek syntax. As I wish to make myself clearly understood, I must bespeak your candour in favour of any little prolixity that may appear in them.

The definitive article denotes that the appellation, whether single or complex, to which it is prefixed, is peculiar to the thing signified, or not common to it with any other thing. Of course it is used in the whole extent of its signification, including all and every thing, to which the single or complex term can be applied. The article might, therefore, be defined to be, the symbol of universality or totality. Accordingly, when it is prefixed to an appellative noun, without any adjunct of limitation expressed or understood, it includes the whole genus, as, ο ανθρωπος, *man*; in which case the article is frequently omitted, as,

πολιτικον γαρ ο ανθρωπος και συζην πεφυκος.—*Arist.*

φυτει πολιτικον ανθρωπος.—*Arist.*

If the article with any term of distinction or limitation, is placed either before or after a noun appellative, the words include as much of the genus, as they can be applied to, as, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνθρώπος, *the good man*, i. e. *every good man*.

And if the appellation, whether single or complex, be peculiar to some individual, it will of course signify that individual only, as, Δημοσθενὲς ὁ ῥήτωρ. Πλάτων ὁ φιλοσοφός. In this case, however, the adjunct of distinction is frequently understood, as ὁ κηρυξ, *the messenger*, meaning, ὁ κηρυξ ὁ προλεγόμενος.—*Thucyd.*

As to the copulative καί, in its proper sense of a copulative, it always implies plurality; and is used to connect words of the same class, if not in grammatical, at least in logical consideration; as, several subjects, several attributes, several predicates or affirmations, or words used as subjects, attributes or predicates: nor does it ever connect dissimilar words, as an attribute to its subject; whether these consist of an adjective and substantive, or of two substantives; as, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνθρώπος. ὁ θεὸς λόγος.

In like manner a proper name and appellative connected as subject and attribute, do not admit the copulative between them, as Πλάτων ὁ φιλοσοφός.

There are, however, two seeming exceptions to this rule concerning the copulative. The first arises from the frequent practice in Greek of prefixing the copulative to all the words connected by it, not excepting the first: and therefore, when an adjective agrees with two following substantives, the copulative may be inserted between the adjective and the first substantive, in the sense rendered by the particle *both*, as,

λεγόμεν—του βελτιονος αἰε καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνεργειαν.—*Arist.*

And when a substantive is followed by two adjectives agreeing with it, the copulative may be inserted between the substantive and the first adjective, as,

ἐν τοῖς συναλλαγμασὶ καὶ τοῖς ἔκουστοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀκουστοῖς.—*Id.*

The other seeming exception, according to which the copulative may be inserted between an adjective and substantive, is, when it is used as an amplification, expressed by *vel*, in Latin; or in English by *though*, or by *even* placed after both the nouns, as,

ἂ οὐδε θεμὶς τῷ τωφροὶ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ βλεπεῖν.—*Origen. Quæ vel verecundo homini adspicere nefas. Which things to behold would be abominable for a modest man even; or for a modest person, though a man.*

Except in the two cases above-mentioned, the attribute is placed, without the copulative, in immediate connexion with its subject; the

article, if it be used at all, being always prefixed to the attribute. When the attribute is the former of the two nouns, there is only one article, as, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνθρώπος. When the attribute is in the latter place, there may be one or two articles, as, ἀνθρώπος ὁ ἀγαθός, or, ὁ ἀνθρώπος ὁ ἀγαθός. When the attribute is placed before the article and subject, the words constitute a whole proposition, as, ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἀνθρώπος, *the man is good*. The same may be said, when the attribute without an article follows the article and subject, as ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀγαθός, *the man is good*: nor is it agreeable to the general idiom of the Greek language to use this last arrangement, to signify, *the good man*, unless there be another attribute or term of distinction inserted between the article and subject, and something farther be expressly affirmed of the whole, as,

ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος ψευδομένους, ἀπορία.—*Arist.*

ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ, ἕτερον ἐστὶ τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς ἕξεως.—*Id.*

ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνῶμη—ἡ τοῦ ἐπικεικὸς ἐστὶ κρείστος εὐθὴ.—*Id.*

When several attributes are connected by the copulative, the Greek writers seem to have been directed to the use of the article solely by a regard to perspicuity; according to which, the general rule is, to repeat the article when different things, and especially when different persons are intended; and to avoid the repetition, when the same thing, and especially when the same person is described: but to this rule there are frequent exceptions, depending often on the mere arrangement of the words. Thus, when two adjectives precede the substantive, though relating to different things expressed by that substantive, the article is not always repeated, as,

οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἰσὰ τὰ οἰνῆα καὶ σιτῆρα μετρά.—*Arist.*

If the adjectives follow the substantives, though they relate to the same person or thing, the article may be repeated or not, as,

Θεὸς ὁ μέγας καὶ ἰσχυρός.—*Jerem.*

Θεὸς ὁ μέγας καὶ ὁ ἰσχυρός.—*Genes.*

ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ ἐπαΐει ὁ Θεὸς τὴν μαχαιρὰν τὴν ἀγίαν, καὶ τὴν μεγάλην, καὶ τὴν ἰσχυρὰν ἐπὶ τὸν δράκοντα.—*Isaiab.*

But if one, or all the attributes follow the subject, and relate to different things expressed by the same noun, the article is invariably repeated; as,

τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πατρικόν, οὐ τ' αὐτὸ τοῦτοις, ἀλλ' ὅμοιον.—*Arist.*

τα τε γὰρ ὑπερβαλλόντα γυμνασία, καὶ τα ελλειπόντα φθίρει τὴν ἰσχυν. *Id.*

καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὄραν καὶ τῶν ἑσχατῶν, νοὺς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος.—*Id.*

The same rule is observed when any restrictive words are used as attributes, and in the same order, as,

τα αυτοις αγαθα, και τα ανθρωποις δυνανται διαρχειν.—*Id.*

When several words of the same class, as several subjects, attributes, predicates, stand in the same relation with regard to each other, as when they all relate to the same thing, or each to a different thing, it is the prevailing, if not the invariable practice, to connect them in the same manner with respect to the copulative; so that if the copulative be omitted at all, it is omitted altogether; and if it be used, it is repeated. In this particular, the Greek construction differs materially from the English. Thus, we should write, *grace, mercy, and peace*, reserving the copulative for the last place. The Greek would be *χαρις, ελεος, ειρηνη, ογ χαρις, και ελεος, και ειρηνη, ας,*

Τυχικος ο αγαπητος αδελφος, και πιστος διακονος, και συνδουλος εν κυριω.—*Coll. iv. 7.*

παρα του κυριου και θεου και σωτηρος ημων Ιησου Χριστου—μαθειν εχεις.—*Clement. Epist.*

ο πολυτιμος και πολυμαθης και Ιουδαιοις και Χριστιανοις αμαθιαν ευκαλων και απαιδευσιαν Κελσος.—*Origen, 529.*

μονον γαρ τον σοφον οι φιλοσοφοι βασιλεια, νομοθετην, στρατηγον, δικαιον, οσιον, θεοφιλη, κηρυττουσι.—*Clem. Alex. 351.*

As several examples of the copulative omitted have been already adduced under my occasional remarks on the *asyndeton*, it is unnecessary to multiply them here: I shall only add, that the several particulars are sometimes collected into pairs, the copulative being inserted between each pair, as in a former example from St. Paul.

οπου ουκ ενι Έλλην και Ιουδαιοις, περιτομη και ακροβυστια, βαρβαρος, Σκυθης, δουλος, ελευθερος.

In the above remarks on the syntax of the article and the copulative, I do not pretend to have produced any thing more than must be familiar, and obvious, to every attentive reader of the Greek language: but the following are such as I have reason to consider in a different light. They are recommended to your particular attention, as they will afford additional evidence, that in the use of the article and the copulative, the Greek writers were governed not so much by any arbitrary rules, as by a regard to perspicuity and distinctness; and that, accordingly, there are some cases, in which the article can not be repeated after the copulative, whether the nouns relate to the same thing or person, or to different things or persons; there are others, in which it must be repeated; and there are others

again, in which the repetition depends on the pleasure of the writer, or perhaps, on prevailing habit ; but in all, the fundamental principle seems to have been a regard to perspicuity : where this was sufficiently secured, either by the terms or the context, there was evidently a proportional latitude allowed in the construction.

There are at least three cases, in which the article cannot be repeated after the copulative, whether the nouns express identity or diversity of persons or things. That which shall be first mentioned, is, when the nouns must be taken conjunctively ; that is, when what is affirmed of them, must be understood as affirmed of them all in conjunction, and cannot be applied to each of them separately, or, when the nouns are not parts of so many distinct sentences, but of one indivisible sentence, as,

ὁ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων, δειλὸς γινέται.—*Arist.*

Here, indeed, the same person is intended ; but it is not for that reason that the article is not repeated ; but because the several nouns connected by the copulative must be taken together to make up the subject of the words δειλὸς γινέται, which could not be affirmed of each of the preceding distinctly : so again,

τίθεασι γὰρ φίλον, τὸν βουλομένον καὶ πράττοντα τ' ἀγαθὰ, ἡ φαινόμενα, ἐκείνου ἑνεκα.—*Id.*

The words τὸν βουλομένον καὶ πράττοντα τ' ἀγαθὰ, must be taken together, to complete the definition of ὁ φίλος. Had either of the terms been a sufficient description of a friend, the article would have been repeated, to express, not different persons, but distinct and complete appellations of the same person, as,

Φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τις ἐστίν. ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικός καὶ πρακτικός, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀκρίβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ το χεῖρον, ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικός, καὶ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπιεικὴς ἐστίν.—*Id.*

This example contains two descriptions of ὁ ἐπιεικὴς.

ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῶ ἀρχοντί καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλίᾳ.—*Id.*

Though different persons are here signified, yet the article is omitted before the second, because the word κοινός, cannot be applied to each of them separately taken, but to them both in conjunction ; for whatever is common, must be so to two persons, or things, at least. Yet I would not venture to affirm, that this is always the construction of the noun κοινός, as the repetition of the article could occasion no obscurity. The propriety of it, however, is evident ; and receives some confirmation from a passage already adduced from *Clemens Alex.*

γίνεται δὲ οὖν τὰ πάντα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὅτι τὰ πάντα τοῦ Θεοῦ· καὶ κοινὰ ἀμφὶν τοῖν φίλοις τὰ πάντα, τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου.

In these instances, the copulative without the article following, has the same sense as the conjunctive preposition *συν*, or the Latin *cum*, *commune est mihi tecum*. From this application of the copulative, the construction of some of the texts, of which you would correct the version, might be accounted for without going farther. Thus the words *ἡ βασιλεία του χριστου και θεου* may be so constructed, to express more emphatically the community of that kingdom—the *common kingdom of Christ and God*. Had the adjective *κοινη* been inserted in its proper place, the construction would have been perfectly regular. If, however, you should consider this remark as a refinement, you are at liberty to reject it; for I shall make no farther use of it; and we will proceed with our examples.

Two infinitives are often comprehended under one common article, and for the same reason as the nouns above, as,

γινεται (ισχυς) γαρ εκ του πολλην τροφην λαμβανειν και πολλους πονους ὑπομενειν.—*Arist.*

The author evidently means that strength is generated, not from each of the two actions distinctly, but from them both in conjunction. The infinitives denote distinct actions, but the words *γινεται ισχυς εκ του* cannot be affirmed of each of them: so again,

ἡ μιν σωτια, τῷ μιν διδοναι και μη λαμβανειν ὑπερβαλλει, τῷ δε λαμβανειν ελλειπει.—*Id.*

το ευδαιμονειν εστιν εν τῷ ζῆν, και ενεργειν.—*Id.*

αγαθον το μη ευξασθαι, η το ευξασθαι και μη αποδουναι.—*Ecclesiast.*

When the infinitives are affirmed of distributively, the article is repeated, as,

χαλεπον δε γινεται και το συγχαιρειν, και το συναλγειν οικειως πολλοις.—*Arist.*

The author is plainly speaking of two distinct difficulties; so that the words *χαλεπον δε γινεται* must be understood as separately affirmed of each of the infinitives.

A second case, in which the article cannot be repeated, arises out of the construction of oppositions. A noun set in opposition to a preceding one has the article repeated, as,

ουδε ὁμοιον εστιν επι τε των τεχνων, και των αρετων.—*Id.*

But when two or more nouns are collected together on one side of such opposition, the article is not repeated on the same side, as,

ουδε γαρ τον αυτον εχει τροπον επι τε των επισημων και δυναμειων, και επι των ἐξεων.—*Id.*

The reason of this construction seems obvious enough. The nouns *επισημων* and *δυναμειων* are not opposed to each other, but both

of them to τῶν ἑξῆων; a distinction that would entirely vanish, if they were all constructed in the same manner: for then the three nouns would stand in equal opposition to each other. The rule is so general, that it is observed in the following example from the fifth book of Thucydides, apparently without the same necessity.

ἡ πολις ἡ μεταπεμφθενη διδοται τῷ μὲν ὀπλιτῇ καὶ ψιλῷ καὶ τοξότη τρεῖς ὀβολοὺς, τῷ δὲ ἱππεῖ, κ. τ. λ.

Though the several nouns are used in a general sense, the construction is not reconcilable to your rule, and so far furnishes another striking exception to it.

In such instances as this last, in which the whole context, especially with the particles μὲν and δέ, renders an adherence to the above rule respecting oppositions less necessary, one might naturally expect to meet with occasional exceptions to it; and therefore, though I have not met with any, I have only called the rule general. But when there is nothing but the article to mark the points of opposition, I have no doubt that the rule holds invariably.

A third case, and the last that I can discover, in which the article cannot be repeated after the copulative, is, when between the article and the first noun there is an attribute, or any term of limitation, common to all the following nouns, as,

ἡ δοξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γιγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν.
—*Arist.*

It is evident, that had the article been prefixed to the latter noun ἡδονῶν, the words would have signified pleasures generally, or universally, instead of the pleasures περὶ τὴν τροφὴν. It is omitted, therefore, to preserve the reference to the foregoing, and common restriction. As this rule is founded on a cogent reason, I have no hesitation in pronouncing it invariable. Examples are of frequent occurrence; such as these,

συμφέρειναι δὴ περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τουναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν.—*Id.*

περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα.—*Id.*

περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά.—*Id.*

τοὺς σφειτεροῖς τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις.—*Id.*

λεγομένη—τοῦ βελτιονοῦς αἰεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνεργείαν.—*Id.*

οἷον τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀναθηματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσιαι.—*Id.*

It may be remarked from the two last examples, that the rule still obtains, though the nouns be of different genders,

ἡ κατὰ χρεῖον ἀγαπητικὴ ἡμῶν διδασκαλία τε καὶ πολιτεία.—*Clem. Alex.*

τεκμηριον εισθαι της τουτου θρασυτητος και τολμης.—*Lysias*.

δειγματα της εκεινου γνωμης και κακοδαιμονιας.—*Demosth.*

ἡ Μακεδονικη αρχη και δυναμις.—*Id.*

It is very rare to meet with nouns personal of the singular number, thus constructed ; the following, however, is one :

ὁ μιν ουν Περσων η Ρωμαιων βασιλειωσ σατραπης και ὑπεροχος η στρατηγος.

—*Cels. ap. Orig.*

The following contains only one personal noun :

δια τουτο εγω τῷ ἁγίῳ Ιουδαιων θεῷ και νομῷ προσεφυγον.—*Clementina*, 655.

The next (to which a particular reference will be made hereafter) contains personal nouns only, and completely overthrows the universality of your rule :

αινουντας ευχαρισειν, τῷ μοι πατρὶ και ὑίῳ, ὑίῳ και πατρὶ, παιδαγωγῷ και διδασκαλῷ ὑίῳ, συν και τῷ ἁγίῳ πνευματι.—*Clem. Alexand.* 266.

It follows, that when the noun subjoined to the copulative is not subject to the preceding attribute or restriction understood, the article must be repeated, as,

ὥσπερ γαρ εν ταις πολεσιν ενισχυει τα νομιμα και τα ἡθη, ὅτω και εν οικειαις οἱ πατρικοι λογοι και τα ἡθη.—*Arist.*

Had the adjective *πατρικος* been understood with the second substantive, the article must have been omitted before it, according to the former examples.

In all the above examples the application of the rule has been considered with relation to different things or persons : when the same thing or person is meant, the rule is still the same, provided the preceding attribute or restriction be common to all the nouns following : when it is not common, and the same person is meant, the connexion is made by the article without the copulative ; in which case the same person will be described by a second and distinct appellation, of which the former makes no part, as,

ὁ μακαριος και μονος δυναστης, ὁ βασιλευς των βασιλευοντων και κυριος των κυριεοντων

The same construction is often used without the same necessity, as,

απέδουσιν εις—τον ἁγιον δημιουργον τον παντοκράτορα μονον θεον.—*Clem. Alex.* 441.

απισειν επιχειρουντας αξιωπισῶ διδασκαλῷ τῷ μονῷ σωτηρὶ θεῷ.—*Id.* 369.

As to the cases in which the repetition of the article after the copulative is especially necessary, they all arise out of a regard to

perspicuity, distinctness, emphasis, or the like ; as may appear from a few examples.

δοκει τε και αλαζων ειναι ο θρασυς και προσποιητικος της ανδρειας — *Arist.*

In this passage the words αλαζων and προσποιητικος are two predicates. Had the latter been a second subject, the article must have been repeated. Accordingly, it will be found a very general rule, that when a second subject follows the predicate, the article must be repeated after the copulative, to distinguish it from a second predicate, with which it might otherwise be confounded ; or even to prevent its appearing to be constructed as one, as,

δοκει δε ο τε παρανομος αδικος ειναι και ο πλεονεκτης, και ο ανισος.—*Id.*

περι ταυτα μιν ουν εισιν ο τε δειλος, και ο θρασυς, και ο ανδρειος.—*Id.*

περι τας τοιαυτας δη ηδονας η σωφροσυνη και η ακολασια εστιν.—*Id.*

τοιουτον δε μαλιστα η επιθυμια και ο παις.—*Id.*

παντες αγαπωσι μαλλον τα αυτων εργα, ωσπερ οι γονεις και οι ποιητοι.—*Id.*

And yet with the same arrangement there are some, though very few, instances of the article not repeated, where the omission can lead to no mistake, as,

ειναι δε τοιουτους ηγουμεθα τους οικονομικους και πολιτικους.—*Id.*

περι ηδονας και λυπας εισιν οι τ' εγκρατεις και καρτερικοι, και ακρατεις και μαλακοι.—*Id.*

In comparisons, distinctions, distributions, the article is especially repeated, as,

τι δε διαφerei η αρετη και η δικαιοσυνη, δηλον.—*Id.*

διηρηται το παθος, και η πρωξις εις ανισα.—*Id.*

το εκουσιον και το ακουσιον διαφerei πολυ.—*Id.*

ο μεντοι κυευτης και ο λωποδυτης και ο λητης των ανελευθερων εισιν.—*Id.*

And when each of the nouns has the copulative with a particular emphasis, as,

εκ γαρ του κιθαριζειν και οι αγαθοι και οι κακοι γιγονται κιθαριζαι.—*Id.*

περι ηδονας και λυπας πασα η πραγματεια, και τη αρετη και τη πολιτικη.—*Id.*

και τω αδικω και τω ακολασω εξην τοιουτοις μη γενεσθαι.—*Id.*

ευϊατος τε γαρ και υπο της ηλικιας, και υπο της αποριας.—*Id.*

But where no obscurity could follow from a different construction, a greater liberty was allowed ; as you have seen in the several exceptions to your first rule : two examples shall be transcribed, that you may compare them without farther trouble :

ειτα περι ποια τον ακρατη, και τον εγκρατη δετεον.—*Id.*

του γαρ εγκρατους και ακρατους τον λογον επαινουμεν.—*Id.*

And now, SIR, if you have impartially considered the above remarks, and recollect the several exceptions produced to your first rule, you may probably suspect, that the texts of scripture which are the immediate objects of this inquiry, may be farther exceptions to the same rule of interpretation : and if you will permit the sacred writers to be explained by themselves, in preference to Chrysostom or Theophylact, that suspicion will approach very near to conviction.

Upon the supposition that your rule may be acknowledged not to hold universally, and that the authority of a few of the Greek fathers is not finally decisive, I take it for granted, that any of the ordinary sources of illustration may be applied to, in the prosecution of this inquiry : such as comparing the author with himself, with the prevailing modes of construction, in the New Testament, the Septuagint, the earliest Fathers, &c. and I shall have recourse to them accordingly.

As the order in which the passages of scripture in question are examined, is of no importance in itself, I shall follow that which seems most suitable to the purpose of illustration ; and, therefore, begin with Ephes. v. 5.

οὐκ ἔχει κληρονομίαν ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ χριστοῦ καὶ θεοῦ.

You insist that one person only can be intended here, because the article is not repeated after the copulative. On the contrary, the insertion of the copulative is, I should think, a clear proof, that two persons are meant, and for these reasons :

1. The noun *χριστος*, though an adjective according to etymology, yet in use and application assumes the nature of a proper name. In this respect it does not essentially differ from such proper names, as *Justus, Clemens, Secundus, Tertius*. It is used as a proper name in a multitude of passages ; such, for instance, as *χριστος ἀπέθανεν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*.—Ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ πάντες ἀποθνήσκουσιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ χριστῷ πάντες ζωοποιήσονται.—Μωσῆς μὲν πιστός ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ οἴκῳ αὐτοῦ, ὡς Δαβὶδ, χριστός δὲ, ὡς υἱός ἐπὶ τὸν οἶκόν αὐτοῦ. In these two passages the word *χριστος* performs the office of a proper name as completely as the words *Adam* and *Moses*.

2. Accordingly the noun *χριστος*, whatever you please to call it, is constructed as a proper name in every passage of the New Testament, with which the one before us can be compared : so that wherever an attribute is joined to it, the connexion is made without the copulative. As Herod the king, is Ἡρώδης ὁ βασιλεὺς ; so Christ the king of Israel,

ὁ χριστός ὁ βασιλεὺς τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ, καταβᾶτω νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ θρόνου.—*Mark*.

The construction is the same with the attributes, *Lord* and *Saviour*, and with others, as,

τῷ γὰρ κυρίῳ χρίστῳ δουλεύετε.—*Coll.* 3.

διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν.—*Tit.* iii. 6.

εἰς καὶ μεσότης Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων, ἀνθρώπος Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς.—*1 Tim.* ii. 5.

εἰ οὗτος ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ ἐκλεκτός τοῦ Θεοῦ.—*Luke* xxiii. 35.

παράκλητον ἐχομένον πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, Ἰησοῦν χριστὸν δίκαιον.—*1 John* ii. 1.

Many similar passages might be referred to, if it were not superfluous. Had there been in the New Testament one such expression as ὁ χριστὸς καὶ κύριος, for *Christ the Lord*, or as Ἰησοῦς ὁ χριστὸς καὶ κύριος, *Jesus the Christ and Lord*, it would have been parallel to that under examination, in the sense you ascribe to it. But as the case actually stands, the passage we are considering must either be an exception to your rule, or a deviation from the constant form of construction in every similar instance. The former supposition contains no improbability, as the noun *χριστός* is a proper name, or *cognomen*; and we have seen that one proper name is sufficient to exempt the passage in which it occurs from the operation of your rule: the latter is in the highest degree improbable. It may be affirmed with confidence, that had one person been intended, the usual construction would have been observed, and the author would have written *χριστοῦ Θεοῦ*, or *τοῦ Θεοῦ χριστοῦ*, or the like. Similar examples occur frequently in the earliest writers, as πάντα ὑπετάζειν Χριστῷ τῷ βασιλεὶ ἡμῶν.—ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν Χριστὸς ἐχρησθη.—*Clem. Alex.*

ἐτοιμοὺς γινέσθαι εἰς Θεοῦ τοῦ χριστοῦ παρουσίαν.—*Id.*

κατὰ δυνάμιν χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ.—*Ignat. ad Trall.*

καλῶς ἐποίησατε ὑποδεξαμένοι ὡς διακόνους χριστοῦ Θεοῦ.—*Ad. Smyrn.*

ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστός.—*Ignat. ad. Mag.*

ἔνδοξον τοῦ σωτηρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν ἀρχιερεῖα τῶν προσφορῶν ἡμῶν.

—*Clem. Rom. Epist.* 1.

τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἐδάκνεν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν.—*Id.*

γινέσθε ἀρετοὶ ἐν πατρὶ χριστῷ τῷ Θεῷ ἡμῶν.—

But here I find from your third edition, which contains all that I know of the laborious work of your diligent correspondent,* that I encounter the imposing and formidable authority of some of the Greek fathers; who must certainly have understood the idiom of their own language. They might so; and yet might have erred, by not advertg to the idiom of the Greek Testament. The whole

[* The Rev. C. Wordsworth, who wrote *Six Letters addressed to Granville Sharp, Esq.* in which he endeavoured to prove, that the early Greek fathers understood the controverted texts in the sense which Mr. Sharp affixed to them.]

weight of their authority may be removed without any mighty effort, either of intellect or of criticism. They evidently understood the two nouns as attributes of a similar class, and therefore, not less properly connected by the copulative to express one person in any situation, than the nouns Lord and Saviour, or the like; but the sacred writers evidently regarded the noun *Christ* in a different light, as appears by their constantly joining an attribute to it (when they join one at all) in the same manner as an adjective to its substantive; not as a co-ordinate epithet. There is, indeed, an instance of the words Lord and Christ, connected by the copulative, where they are distinct predicates of a proposition resolvable into two: but that instance is foreign to the present argument.

1 Tim. v. 21.—Διαμαρτυρομαι ενωπιον του Θεου και κυριου Ιησου Χριστου και των εκλεκτων αγγελων. κ. τ. λ.

It is very doubtful whether the noun *κυριος* be part of the true reading or not; but upon either supposition, your proposed version is exposed to insuperable objections. If the word in question be omitted, the rest remaining in the same order as above, the passage is unaffected by your rule, the proper name being immediately subjoined to the copulative. If you adopt the order of the Alexandrian manuscript, and place the noun *Χριστος* next after the copulative, the same objections occur as to the former example. In no similar instance, of unequivocal signification, do the sacred writers insert the copulative between an attribute and a name of Jesus, whether that name be *Christ*, or *Jesus*, or *Christ Jesus*, or *Jesus Christ*; *ὁ Θεος και Χριστος Ιησους* for one person, is as little congruous to the style of the New Testament, as would be, *ὁ κυριος και Χριστος*, or *Ιησους ὁ κυριος και Χριστος*: and to suppose that St. Paul would deviate from the usual construction, where an adherence to it would have prevented all ambiguity, is repugnant to any principles of rational criticism. How easy, and how natural, would it have been for him to write *ενωπιον του Θεου ἡμων Ιησου Χριστου*, or *Ιησου Χριστου του Θεου*, &c. as well as *του κυριου ἡμων Ιησου Χριστου*—*Ιησου Χριστου του κυριου ἡμων*, and the like?

If on the other hand we suppose the noun *κυριος* to be part of the original context, your version is liable to objections, *first*, from the order of the words; and, *secondly*, from a comparison with two passages of similar import from the pen of the same writer, neither of which can be interpreted in agreement with your rule.

As to the order of the words, it is evident that by inverting the two nouns, all ambiguity would be removed, as *ενωπιον του κυριου και*

Θεου Ἰησου Χριστου ; and it is highly probable, independently of the advantage attainable by it of greater perspicuity, that such an arrangement would have been observed, had the author intended to describe no more than one person ; because such arrangement would have been consonant to that which constantly prevails throughout the New Testament in every parallel instance. Thus when the two attributes *Lord* and *Saviour*, are together ascribed to Christ, the noun *κύριος* is never so placed as to be connected with the other by following the copulative, as *εις την αιωνιον βασιλειαν του κυριου ἡμῶν και σωτηρος Ἰησου Χριστου*.—2 *Pet.* i. 11.

In the same epistle there are other similar examples ; but it is useless to transcribe them, as the arrangement, I am speaking of, is so familiar to every ear, that the contrary one would hardly be tolerated even in English—*our Saviour and Lord Jesus Christ*. But as St. Peter is no rule for St. Paul, I add one from the latter writer, which may afford some presumption at least what sort of arrangement would have suggested itself to him, had he been describing the same person in the passage under examination : *ειρηνη απο Θεου πατρος, και κυριου Ἰησου Χριστου του σωτηρος ἡμῶν*. This arrangement would have removed all ambiguity ; *ενωπιον κυριου Ἰησου Χριστου του Θεου*, as *ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν και Θεος Ἰησους Χριστος ὁ υἱος του Θεου του ζωντος πρωτον εποιησε*.—*Ignat. ad. Ephes. interpol.*

If, however, you should regard these remarks on the order of the words, as of little consequence, you must be differently affected by comparing the two next examples.

2 *Tim.* iv. 1. *Διαμαρτυρομαι ουν εγω ενωπιον του Θεου και Ἰησου Χριστου του μελλοντος κρινειν ζωντας και νεκρους, κ. τ. λ.*

This is the reading of Griesbach's Testament ; the common reading has *του κυριου*, after the copulative ; you prefer *κυριου*, omitting the article, but without sufficient authority ; the best reading, according to the authority of the most ancient and valuable MSS. is *Χριστου Ἰησου*, not *Ἰησου Χριστου*, the noun *κύριος* being omitted. With this reading we must understand two persons to be intended for the reason already assigned, namely, that it is contrary to the invariable construction of the New Testament to insert the copulative between the nouns, *Ἰησους* or *Χριστος*, or *Ἰησους Χριστος*, and any of the indisputable attributes of Christ. But the next parallel passage will decide the question, if any remain.

1 *Tim.* vi. 13. *Παραγγελλω σοι ενωπιον του Θεου του ζωοποιουντος τα παντα, και Χριστου Ἰησου του μαρτυρησαντος επι Ποντιου Πιλατου την καλην ὁμολογίαν.*

You acknowledge, as you necessarily must, that in this last passage, the names of distinct persons are connected by the copulative ; and of course in the former one. For what is the difference between them ? In both, according to the most authoritative reading of the former, the name *Χριστος Ιησους* is immediately subjoined to the copulative ; and in both, that name is immediately followed by the article and a participle ; *του μελλοντος—του μαρτυρησαντος*. If it be admitted that the noun *κυριος* should be rejected from the first of the three passages, (and it is so cited by *Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 1.*) then they are all equally descriptive of distinct persons by construction, independently of the light reflected upon the two former from the last : but if you will have the noun *κυριος* to make part of the original context, (except in the last passage) you are, I am persuaded, contending for two direct exceptions to your rule, provided St. Paul be allowed to interpret himself. For what have we before us in the three passages ? They are neither more nor less than so many similar obtestations, from the same author, addressed to the same person, comprising terms of the same import ;—*before God and Christ Jesus*. I should think it utterly repugnant to any rational principle of criticism to imagine any such difference of signification in them, as you would ascribe to them ; and upon no better evidence, than that of a doubtful reading, interpreted by a rule that is liable to many exceptions, and not even applicable to any of the passages hitherto examined, but upon the improbable supposition that they are deviations from the form of construction observed in all similar instances : though that form has the advantage of being in no respect ambiguous.

It may be added here, that St. Paul uses this expression, *ενωπιον του Θεου*, where God the father only can be meant, as *ὁ δε γραφω υμιν, ιδου ενωπιον του Θεου, οτι ου ψευδομασι. Gal. i. 20.—ενωπιον του σωτηρος ημων Θεου.—1 Tim. ii. 3.*

2 *Thess. i. 12. Κατα την χαριν του Θεου ημων και κυριου Ιησου Χριστου.*

I cannot think that St. Paul intended to denominate one person only in this passage, because *first*, in the Septuagint, when these words *κυριος* and *Θεος* are ascribed to one person, the connexion is made without the copulative ; *κυριος ὁ Θεος, ὁ κυριος ὁ Θεος, the Lord God—κυριος ὁ Θεος ημων, the Lord our God*. St. Paul had only to adopt this arrangement, with which he must have been sufficiently acquainted, and the whole would have been incapable of any other sense than that which you attribute to it : as *κατα την χαριν κυριου*

του Θεου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, and, therefore, I apprehend that the insertion of the copulative between the two nouns affords a strong presumption that he meant to separate the latter, *κυριος*, from the preceding *ὁ Θεος*, and assign it to the proper name, as a distinct subject.

But, *secondly*, had he preferred the insertion of the copulative to designate the same person, it is highly probable that he would have chosen a different arrangement, so as to preserve to the noun *κυριος* its usual construction, *του κυριου και Θεου Ἰησοῦ Χριστου*, which would also have determined, beyond dispute, the application of *Θεου*.

On a former occasion, I forbore to urge, as far as I might have done, this argument founded on the arrangement of the words, because it was there less necessary : but on this, where it appears to me nearly decisive of the author's meaning, if not entirely so, I think it expedient to be more particular ; and, therefore, I observe, that the noun *κυριος* being in an eminent degree the discriminating and leading title of Christ, it always takes, in the New Testament, where there is no room for doubt, an emphatical and prominent position ; not the subordinate one, to which you would reduce it. In the only passage that unequivocally applies the two nouns *Lord* and *God*, to Christ, namely, the address of St. Thomas, the former preserves its proper position, though the two are expressed distinctly, not conjunctively, *my Lord, and my God*.

Had all or any of the passages, we are considering, been understood from the first, in the sense you impute to them, they must have found their way, as forms, I mean, or models of construction, into the earliest writings of the Christian Church ; because they would have been the only models to be adopted. But in the earliest writings, whether genuine or spurious, those in particular collected by *Cotelerius*, under the common title of *Patres Apostolici*, though containing several conjunctive applications of the titles *Lord* and *God* to Christ, the collocation is never what it most probably would have been, had the authors understood St. Paul as you do ; take these examples :

ὁ εἰς κυριος και Θεος Ἰησους Χριστος.—*Mart.—Ignat.* 163.

ὁ κυριος ἡμῶν και Θεος Ἰησους Χριστος ὁ υἱος του Θεου του ζωντος.—*Ignat. ad. Ephes. interpol.*

παρεα του κυριου και Θεου και σωτηρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστου.—*μαθην εχης. —Clement. Epitome.*

εχομεν ιατρον και τον κυριον ἡμῶν Θεον Ἰησουν τον Χριστον.—*Ignat. ad. Ephes. interpol.*

απειναντι γαρ των του κυριου και Θεου εστιν οφθαλμων.—*Polycarpi Epist.*

In this last example the words are not apparently applied to Christ; but they serve to show the order that would be observed in applying them to any one person.

Lastly, If to these arguments be added the consideration that St. Paul frequently employs the noun *Θεός* absolutely in direct contradistinction to our Lord Jesus Christ, as in the benediction, *The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God*, &c. that he tells us, we have *one God, the Father; and one Lord, Jesus Christ*; and that your rule is liable to various and indisputable exceptions, you may perhaps think that an impartial reader may have sufficient reason to add the passage at the head of this discussion to those exceptions. In this light I shall continue to regard it, until I meet with more convincing arguments to alter my opinion, than any you have been able to advance; and in the same light I consider the following, without apprehension of error.

Jude 4. και τον μονον δεσποτην Θεον, και κυριον ημων Ιησουν Χριστον αγγελλουσιν.

In every point of view in which I can contemplate this passage, there occur to me insuperable objections to your translation of it; whether I reflect upon the construction, or upon the sense of the words employed. With respect to the former, you understand the three nouns *δεσποτην*, *Θεον*, *κυριον*, as so many attributes of Jesus Christ. Had this been the intention of the writer, it is exceedingly probable, because much more agreeable to the idiom of the language, that he would have inserted the copulative between each of them, as in these instances:

αναγκαιον δε ηγησαμην Επαφροδιτον τον αδελφον και συνεργον και συζητητην μου, υμων δε αποστολον, και λειτουργον της χρειας μου, περιψαι προς υμας.—*Phil.* ii. 25.

Τυχικος ο αγαπητος αδελφος, και πιστος διακονος, και συνδουλος εν κυριω.—*Coll.* iv. 7.

και επιμψαμεν Τιμοθειον, τον αδελφον ημων, και διακονον του Θεου, και συνεργον ημων.—*1 Thess.* iii. 2.

On the other hand, if you should change your ground a little, and understand the noun *δεσποτην* as the attribute of *Θεον*, and, therefore, as performing the office of an adjective to it, in the sense of the *only supreme God*; then it would have accorded better with the Greek syntax, to have made the connexion with the following *κυριον* by the article without the copulative, *τον μονον δεσποτην Θεον, τον κυριον ημων*; which was also a very obvious and easy expedient to exclude

all ambiguity from the passage. I believe you will find it to be a general, if not invariable, rule ; when the article, attribute, and substantive, are followed by another substantive, a farther appellation of the same person or thing, the attribute not being intended as common to the two, that the connexion is made by the article alone ; of this construction I have already given some examples, with the reason of it, as,

ὁ μακαριος και μονος δυνατης, ὁ βασιλευς των βασιλευντων και κυριος των κυριουντων.—1 Tim. vi. 15.

ἐξαπιστειλε τον μονογενη αυτου υιον τον κυριον ημων Ιησουν Χριστον.—Clementin. 762.

In the former of these examples I suppose St. Paul did not intend the adjectives μακαριος and μονος to be understood with βασιλευς ; yet as there was no incongruity in the application, he might have substituted the copulative for the article ; but in the latter, the connexion could not be made otherwise than it is, because the adjective μονογενη could not be applied to κυριον.

The uncommonness of the construction in the passage from St. Jude, supposing only one person to be meant, seems to have induced the Complutensian editors to put a correcting hand to it, *contra codices* (see Griesbach's Test.) thus, τον μονον δισποτην και Θεον τον κυριον ημων Ιησουν Χριστον, which indeed would render the whole clear and plain ; and shews at the same time that, understanding the passage as you do, they were dissatisfied with the construction.

However, taking the passage as it is given in our common editions, the former portion of it is in construction exactly parallel with ὁ σωτηρ ημων Θεος ; which occurs several times in the writings of St. Paul. Now ὁ σωτηρ, in this form of expression is not a discriminating attribute, as if there was a Saviour God, besides other Gods not Saviours ; but the noun Θεος is the particularizing name ; and performs the same office that a proper name would in the same place ; and the words may be rendered precisely, *our Saviour, namely God* : or, as they are rendered in the common version, *God our Saviour*. In the same manner may the whole passage of Jude be rendered :

*Denying God the supreme governor, and our Lord Jesus Christ.**

And that such is the true rendering, as to the sense, whether Θεος be part of the original or not, may be placed beyond all reasonable doubt, if we farther consider the signification of the noun δισποτης, as well as its actual application in the New Testament, and in the

* Since these remarks were written, I have, by accident, seen an English version of the date of 1585, in which the passage of St. Jude is thus rendered, *Denying God the only Lord, and the Lord Jesus Christ*.

most ancient writings of the Christian Church. The noun *δεσποτης* is *Herus*, and is used by St. Paul as equivalent to *οικοδεσποτης*, *pater familias*.

εν μεγαλη δε οικια ουκ εστι μονον σκευη χρυσα̃ και αργυρα̃ ει ουν τις εκκαθαρη̃ εαυτον απο τουτων, εσαι σκευος εις τιμην, ηγιασμενον και ευχερην τω δεσποτη.—2 Tim. ii. 20.

Now our Lord is not *ο δεσποτης*, *pater familias*; still less is he *ο μοριος δεσποτης*, in his father's house, but the son and heir of all things: accordingly there is not a passage in the New Testament that unequivocally ascribes this title to Christ; but several that do to God the Father, as above, and,

νυν απολυνεις τον δουλων σου, δεσποτα, κατα το ρημα σου.—Luke ii. 29.
ομοθυμαδον ηραν φωνην προς τον Θεον, και ειπον· δεσποτα, συ ο Θεος, ο ποιησας. κ. τ. λ.—Acts iv. 24.

Clemens Romanus, whose first epistle approaches the nearest of all the ancient writings in style, and therefore, in point of authority, to the canonical scriptures, uses the same noun as equivalent to *ο Θεος*, and in contradistinction to our Lord Jesus Christ, as,

θισωσι δι' αυτου (Νωε) ο δεσποτης τα ειςελθοντα εν ομοιοια ζωα εις την κιβωτον.—151.

ταυτα παντα ο μεγας δημιουργος και δεσποτης των απαντων εν ειρηνη και ομοιοια προσεταξεν ειναι, ενεργετων τα παντα, υπερεκπερισσως δε ημας τους προσπεφυγοτας τοις οικτιρμοις αυτου, δια του κυριου ημων Ιησου Χριστου.—159.

κατανοησωμεν, αγαπητοι, πως ο δεσποτης επιδικνυται διηνεκας ημιν την μελλουσαν αναστασιν εσεσθαι, ης την απαρχην εποιησατο τον κυριον Ιησουν Χριστον.—160.

δια τουτου (χριστου) ηβλησεν ο δεσποτης της αθανατου γνωσεως ημας γενεσασθαι.—167.

In the same epistle there are more passages of the same kind, one of which I will select, as it is completely parallel with the former part of St. Jude's.

ηξιωσεν (Εσθη) τον παντοποιητην δεσποτην Θεον των αιωνων.—178.

Justin Martyr uses the same word as distinct from *υιος*.

η πρωτη δυναμις, μετα τον πατερα παντων και δεσποτην Θεον, και υιος, ο λογος εστιν.—See *Clarke on the Trin.* 119.

εν ονοματι του πατρος των όλων και δεσποτου Θεου, και του σωτηρος ημων Χριστου Ιησου, και πνευματος αγιου.—See *Bingham's Antiq.* vol. iv. 191.

Not having the works of Justin Martyr, I am obliged to refer to *Clarke* and *Bingham*.

Two or three of the above cited passages from *Clem. Rom.* are also quoted by *Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 4.* whose authority may there-

fore be added to that of his predecessors; and indeed the consentient language of antiquity, which has appropriated the titles of supremacy, as ὁ μόνος Θεός, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός, Θεός ὁ παντοκράτωρ, ὁ παντίποπτος Θεός, to the God and father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

You are aware, as unavoidably you must be, that your interpretation of St. Jude, as well as of St. Paul in another text, may prove rather too much for the credit of your rule, as it applies to our Lord the titles of *the only potentate God*, and *the great God*; which are evidently titles of supremacy, equivalent to ὁ μακάριος καὶ μόνος δυναστής, and therefore incommunicable; for a communicable supremacy, in the proper sense of the words, is a contradiction in terms. You meet the objection by saying, "that the *true Unitarian Christian*, being convinced that the *supreme attributes* of the divine nature are applied to each of the three divine persons in both the Testaments, will, of course, be aware also that each of these divine persons must necessarily be *the great God*, and *the only potentate*, as there is but one God, *one only supreme power or Godhead*."

This, Sir, is not the language of venerable antiquity, which has uniformly preserved the distinction between ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός, and ὁ μονογενὴς Θεός; without fearing the imputation of maintaining the existence of a superior and inferior God. The unity of the godhead, Θεότης, was secured by asserting one only fountain and root of Deity. Such words are figurative indeed, but they are intelligible. From the supreme attributes, of which you speak, you must except, I should suppose, that of underived self-existence, which is the basis of essential supremacy, and which gives and appropriates the same quality of essential supremacy to all the attributes of the Father, without derogating from the divinity of the Son. The former, even in the Nicene Creed, is distinguished by the title of Θεός ὁ παντοκράτωρ; the latter is there denominated, not ὁ Θεός, but Θεός ἐκ Θεοῦ, in language as orthodox, guarded, and circumspect, as could possibly be put together. You must acknowledge that the Father is the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, and that our Lord is not the God of his father; that is, you must acknowledge a supremacy not communicable, and which is the foundation of all those high titles of pre-eminence that are appropriated to the Father: so that your observations do not remove the objection you have stated. It exists in all its force, and, added to the arguments that have been brought forward, proves, at least to my present conviction, that St. Jude speaks of two distinct persons, and furnishes a direct, and fatal exception to your rule. If any thing farther were wanting to show the fallacy of

that rule, as an universal one, the following passage from *Clem. Alex.* will be abundantly sufficient; which I have reserved to this place, for particular consideration, on account of its near resemblance to that under examination :

αινουντας ευχαριζειν, τῷ μονῷ πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ, υἱῷ καὶ πατρὶ, παιδαγωγῷ καὶ διδασκαλῷ υἱῷ, συν καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι.

This passage occurs in an address of praise to the Trinity, at the end of his *Pedagogue*, in which he represents the Trinity as being all one, ἐν, one thing or being, not one person. That the article was not omitted after the copulative to express that unity, is plain from his speaking of the Holy Spirit, in as strong a form of distinction as the language would admit : but the article was omitted, as I understand him, for the same reason as in some former instances ; because the adjective *μονῷ* is common to the two following nouns, *Praising the only Father, and (only) Son*, &c. but for whatever purpose the article was not repeated, the passage is another direct exception to your rule : and this being admitted, the remaining texts will not give us much trouble.

2 *Pet.* i. 1. ἐν δικαιοσυνῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

The arrangement of the words suggests no objection to your rendering of them ; on the contrary they correspond exactly with what follows very soon after in the same chapter, verse 11. εἰς τὴν κωνίαν βασιλείαν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ : and this parallelism would undoubtedly support you as a mere grammarian, or philologist. But on the broad principles of general criticism, there arise very strong objections to your interpretation. The attributes *Lord* and *Saviour*, applied to the same person, are usually connected by the copulative ; but the nouns *σωτῆρ* and *Θεός* are as regularly connected without it, as κατ' ἐπιταγὴν τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Θεοῦ. *Tit.* i. 4. — ἵνα τὴν διδασκαλίαν τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Θεοῦ. ii. 10. — ἡ φιλανθρωπία ἐπέφανη τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Θεοῦ. iii. 4. and therefore the interposition of the copulative must appear to render St. Peter somewhat ambiguous. It will be said, why then do you not understand him according to the prevailing idiom of the language ? I answer, because he appears to me to have explained himself in the very next verse, ἐν ἐπιγνώσει τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν. It is not very probable that he would thus, in immediate consecution, use the words God and the Saviour Jesus Christ, and, God and our Lord Jesus Christ, first to signify one person, and then two ; without any assignable reason for so remarkable a difference.

Moreover, the righteousness of God, occurs so frequently in the writings of St. Paul, who is quoted in this epistle of St. Peter, that we may be well justified in paraphrasing the passage, so as to signify that justification which we receive from God through the mediator.

The reading is somewhat doubtful ; some copies have the pronoun *ἡμῶν* repeated, with other varieties ; but I pass over this circumstance, as of no great moment ; though as far as it goes, it is unfavourable to your interpretation. What I would farther observe is, that when you undertake to inform the English reader of the true meaning of the words in a proper English idiom, by placing the proper name first, you seem to forget, that such arrangement is no more an English, than it is a Greek idiom. It would be equally proper and equally unequivocal in the latter, as in the former language. Had St. Peter only thought of doing for himself in Greek, what you have done for him in English ; not the least, even grammatical, ambiguity would have adhered to his words. He might surely have written, *Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν*, and I fear you will find it difficult to assign any reason for his not so doing, that shall be so respectful towards him, as acknowledging that he meant to denominate two persons. But of this more hereafter.

Tit. ii. 13.—*προσδεχομενοι την μακαριαν ελπιδα και επιφανειαν της δοξης του μεγαλου Θεου, και σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.*

In this passage the adjective *μακαριαν* being common to the two following nouns, the article is not repeated before the second, *επιφανειαν*—*the blessed hope and (blessed) appearance*. Of this invariable rule of construction, we have had already many examples. I will add two or three more from the New Testament, to save your time :—*ἡ τε αἰδὸς αὐτοῦ δυναμὶς καὶ δεισιότης*—*τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ καλοῦντος ὑμᾶς εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ βασιλειαν καὶ δόξαν*—*εἶπε δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς πρὸς τοὺς παραγινόμενους ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ σφατηγούς τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ πρεσβυτέρους*. Of the same kind you will find several more.

Now, Sir, if you understand the adjective *μεγαλου* as common to the two following nouns, as you must upon your own hypothesis, we have then a sufficient reason to assign for the omission of the article before the second, whether one, or two persons be intended. The sense of the whole might then be, *looking for the blessed hope and (blessed) appearance of the glory of the great God, and our (great) Saviour Jesus Christ*. If it be said that our Lord is no where else called the great Saviour ; neither is he called *ὁ μέγας Θεός*, nor any thing like it.

However it must be acknowledged, (for nothing, carrying the least appearance of subterfuge, can be tolerated on such an occasion) that it is very rare to meet with nouns personal in the singular number, constructed as above; I mean with an article and adjective common to two following nouns, relating to different persons. But as instances of nouns not personal so constructed are very frequent; as we have had *ονε*, in which the former is a personal noun, *τω ἀ-γωιω Ιουδαϊων Θεω και νεμω*, another just now from St. Luke, in which both nouns are personal nouns, plural, *τους παραγενομενους επ' αυτον αρχιεις και στρατηγους*, and a still more remarkable one from *Clem. Alex.* in which both the personal nouns are singular, *τω μονω πατρι και υιω*—with such instances before us, the application of the rule to the text under consideration, will not be thought forced, in a grammatical point of view. But in the present case, though it might suggest a plausible reason for the omission of a second article, there is no necessity for laying any stress upon it: the words *του μεγαλου Θεου* have in themselves a just claim to be considered as one of the pre-eminent and incommunicable titles of God the Father. It is more agreeable to the general tenor and language of scripture so to regard them.

ὁ γαρ κυριος ὁ Θεος ἡμῶν, οὗτος Θεος τῶν θείων, και κυριος τῶν κυριῶν, ὁ Θεος ὁ μέγας και ισχυρος και φοβερὸς.—*Deuter. x. 17.*

There are many passages similar to this; which also accords with St. Paul's *King of kings, and Lord of lords*, necessarily understood of God the Father.

The observation that God is never said to appear, and that the word *επιφανεια* must be understood of some appearance of Christ only, is of no consequence. St. Paul, is not speaking, of the appearance of God, but, of the glory of God; and our Lord has told us, that he will come in the glory of his father. The common version, which renders *της δοξης* as equivalent to an adjective, *the glorious appearance*, is the less suitable to the context, as the noun *επιφανεια*, is already furnished with its proper adjective *μακαρια*: besides, St. Paul says, that through Christ we rejoice in the hope of the glory of God, *καυχωμεθα επ' ελπιδα της δοξης του Θεου*: a coincidence of expression, not a little illustrative of a passage from the same pen.

The observation of *Whitby* that *Clem. Alex.* quotes this text of St. Paul, when he is asserting the divinity of Christ, if it mean that he quotes it as an argument, or proof, is a mistake. *Clemens* is all along speaking of a past appearance only, and therefore he begins his quotation with a former verse. *ἡ χάρις του Θεου ἡ σωτηριος πασιν*

ἀνθρώποις ἐπιφανῇ, &c. and then proceeds, *τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ καίνον, ἡ ἐπιφάνεια, ἣ νυν ἐκλαμψασα ἐν ἡμῖν τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντος καὶ προούτος λόγου. ἐπιφανῇ δὲ ἐναγχος ὁ προὖν Σωτῆρ, &c.* so that his authority inclines the other way : for he has not appealed to this text, though he had it before him, when he was expressly asserting the divinity of Christ, as Θεός, and ὁ Θεός λόγος, but not as ὁ μέγας Θεός. It may be added here, that as the gracious appearance of Christ upon earth, is represented by St. Paul as the appearing of the grace of God ; so his glorious appearance hereafter, may well be described as the appearance of the glory of God.

The authority of some of the Greek fathers, appealed to in your support, adds nothing to the solidity of your inferences ; it only serves to prove, what will not be contested, that your first rule has a real foundation in the idiom of the language ; but has no tendency to prove that this or that particular text, cannot be an exception to your rule, or, if you please, a violation of that idiom. The possibility of this seems never to have occurred to them, as a question to be examined on the broad basis of general criticism. They read and understood the New Testament as any man naturally reads and understands his native language ; and for this reason especially, might unwarily fall into mistakes in their expositions. What is called the natural and obvious sense of an author, is not always his true sense ; particularly when that author writes in a foreign language, and clothes his own idioms in it. That such is the character of the Greek text of the New Testament is maintained by the acutest critics of modern times ; though some of them may perhaps have been too fond of finding out Hebraisms, Syriasms, &c. Be this as it may, it is because the Greek fathers, those of whom we are now speaking, acquiesced without farther inquiry in what appeared to them the natural sense, that they failed to ask themselves, why, for instance, a copulative should be inserted between ὁ Χριστός and Θεός, by St. Paul, who never inserts one between Χριστός and κυριός, though the construction ought evidently to have been the same in both cases, had the same person been intended in both ; and is found in fact to be the same in the earliest writings of the Greek churches ; Χριστός ὁ Θεός, and the like, occurring in them as familiarly, though not so frequently, as Χριστός ὁ κυριός, &c. Even Theodoret, it seems, has once *inadvertently* written Θεοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, so that according to him the copulative is a redundancy, to say the least of it.

I regret that my little library will not enable me to trace the time when the form ὁ Χριστός καὶ Θεός, as well as those of the other

texts under discussion, began first to be used as indisputably descriptive of one person. Certainly not in the Apostolic age, nor for a considerable time after. The discovery would throw some light upon the history of sacred criticism, and some upon the present subject. As long as those forms were not in use, they were either not understood in the sense you ascribe to them, or were not thought sufficiently explicit and unequivocal.

What has been observed concerning those Greek fathers, whose authority is cited in support of your opinion; that it does not appear to have ever occurred to them as an object of critical investigation, whether the several texts, we have been examining, were particular deviations from the prevailing idiom, is equally applicable to yourself. After having established, by a fair induction of particulars, a general rule of interpretation, with the exception of plurals and proper names only, you ought, I apprehend, to have inquired whether that rule was liable, or not, to farther exceptions, and of what nature; so as to reduce them, if possible, to some common character; and then to have stated, and fairly examined, the question, whether those passages, to the interpretation of which you would apply your rule, belonged to the class of exceptions, or if not, whether they might not be particular and anomalous exceptions. The neglect of this, I regard, as a radical defect that pervades and vitiates your whole tract: a defect, which I have endeavoured to the best of my abilities to supply. How far I have succeeded must remain with others to determine.

As to the objection which has been deduced from the consideration that a different construction would have been chosen to secure to the several texts the sense you ascribe to them; I consider it as completely decisive, where the noun $\chi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\varsigma$ is placed either immediately before, or immediately after, the copulative: in the other passages, where the nouns $\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ and $\kappa\upsilon\rho\iota\omicron\varsigma$ or $\sigma\alpha\tau\eta\rho$ occur in direct consecution, that objection might claim but little respect, if applicable to any one instance exclusively; but as applicable to them all, it must appear to carry too much weight to be easily overruled. For why should the copulative be thrust between nouns, which in other instances are placed in immediate connexion to express one person? Or if the usual construction must, contrary to all probability, be abandoned without altering the sense, why should the important noun $\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ be always on the unfavourable side of the copulative, and never be joined immediately to the proper name, as it might have been in perfect conformity with the idiom of the language, and as it

was in the times immediately succeeding that of the Apostles? The construction to which I object in your sense of the passages, was an innovation of later days; but when introduced, I have already said, I possess not the means of determining with precision.

When to these reflections is added the sense of the words employed, together with the various exceptions to your rule, I think I stand upon solid ground, when I assert, that there exists no necessity for altering the common version in these particular passages; and that you have not decisively applied a rule of construction to the correction of that version.

To all this, you have two main objections to urge, which you consider as decisive on your part. The former is, that the several passages are in construction parallel with ὁ Θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ, and ought to be interpreted accordingly. Now, Sir, if your rule and principles of criticism must be permitted to close up every other source of illustration, there is an end of all farther enquiry; but if not, we may observe, that the same Almighty Being is called indifferently Θεός, πατήρ, Θεὸς πατήρ, ὁ Θεός καὶ πατήρ, and once, ὁ Θεὸς πατήρ, but where do we meet with ὁ Θεὸς Χριστός? Not in the New Testament, though frequently enough in other writings. And here I cannot help remarking the strange, not to say, extravagant language of Beza on occasion of the the text, του μεγάλου Θεου καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ; on which he goes so far as to say, “dico non magis *probabiliter* ista *posse* ad duas distinctas personas referri, quam illam locutionem, ὁ Θεὸς καὶ πατήρ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.” How can two such passages be brought together in a comparison of *probabilities*? The latter cannot *possibly* be understood of more than one person, independently of a grammatical rule; it is surely too much to say the same of the former.*

Your second objection is, that if, in any of the texts that have been examined, distinct persons had been intended, the distinction would have been preserved by the repetition of the article. But it is not a little remarkable, that there is no instance in the New Testament, of such distinction being so preserved, between the particular nouns in question; I mean when the nouns Θεός and κυριός or σωτήρ are connect-

* It is not undeserving of notice in this place, that there is no such expression in the New Testament, as ὁ πατήρ Θεός, or Θεός ὁ πατήρ. Of these expressions, the latter especially would imply an acknowledgment of more Gods than one, contrary to the decisive tenor of the sacred volume; the addition ὁ πατήρ, in such arrangement, being, according to the idiom of the language, constructed as a discriminating attribute. The use of this expression Θεός ὁ πατήρ, was another innovation of later days.

ed by the copulative : the form of construction is then, *Θεός και κυριός*, *ὁ Θεός και κυριός*, but never *ὁ Θεός και ὁ κυριός*. The most probable reason that I can imagine for this peculiarity is, that these particular nouns, when unequivocally descriptive of one person, being connected throughout the Septuagint, and the New Testament, without the copulative, as *κυριός ὁ Θεός* in abundance of instances in the former—*ὁ Θεός ὁ σωτὴς* in several—*ἐπὶ κυρίον τον Θεον αυταν*,—*ἐπὶ τῷ Θεῳ τῷ σωτῆρι μου*. *St. Luke*.—*του σωτηρος ἡμων Θεου*. *St. Paul*.—the reason, I say, may be, that the sacred writers naturally felt the interposition of the copulative, as a sufficient mark of personal diversity, without being aware of the necessity of the farther mark of discrimination. which you would require from them. There would be nothing improper, nothing ungrammatical, nor a particle of ambiguity, in writing *κυριός ὁ Θεός* *Ιησους Χριστός* ; and it is quite as probable that, with these particular nouns, they would have omitted the copulative to express one person, as that they would have repeated the article to express two. At all events, as you have founded an argument upon what would have been the construction, to accord with a presumed signification, you can have no just objection to the employment of the same kind of reasoning on the opposite side of the question.

What has been observed concerning the manner of connecting the noun *Χριστός* with its attribute, as well as the nouns *κυριός* and *Θεός* or *σωτὴς*, to denote the same person, viz. that they are, throughout the Greek Bible, joined without the copulative, will furnish a satisfactory answer to a remark of yours, which constitutes a prominent feature in your argument. There are, you say, no exceptions, in the New Testament, to your rule ; that is, I suppose, unless these particular texts be such ; which you think utterly improbable. You would argue, then, that if these texts were exceptions, there would be more. I do not perceive any great weight in this hypothetical reasoning. But, however plausible it may appear, the reply is at hand. There are no other words so likely to yield exceptions ; because there are no other words, between which the insertion of the copulative, would effect so remarkable a deviation from the established form of constructing them to express one person ; and of course, would so pointedly suggest a difference of signification. Had the form *ὁ Θεός και κυριός ἡμων*, as well as *Θεός ὁ κυριός ἡμων*, and, in the same sense, been in use in the Septuagint, or the New Testament, or *ὁ Χριστός και κυριός* in the latter, for one person, all this reasoning would have been spared ; but as the contrary is the fact, it is nothing surprising to find all these particular texts in question appearing

as exceptions to your rule, and the sole exceptions ; I mean in the New Testament ; for we have had an incontrovertible one from the Septuagint.

Throughout the whole of this discussion, I have purposely endeavoured, as far as your tract would permit me, to render the argument and the inference inaccessible to the mere English reader ; because I consider him totally incompetent to estimate the force of the one, and of course the justness of the other : except indeed, what could not be avoided, that I have distinctly stated my present conviction, that the common version needs not those corrections you would bestow upon it. This intermediate inference is expressed without reserve ; but how far it may be supposed to affect the evidence for a fundamental article of the catholic faith, he is not invited by me to consider. I would rather tell him, that he may rest satisfied with his Testament, and may consult it with his habitual veneration ; that a better translation upon the whole, and better adapted to his purposes, will not easily be obtained. The learned will not acquiesce in the authority of any version, however excellent, but will have recourse to the original for information : so that I agree with you in deprecating all clamour, not Socinian only, about the necessity of a new translation ; all calumnious charges of corruption ; and all arrogant attempts at imaginary correction ; and even all pretensions to a more close and literal rendering of the original text. To give to certain words a new arrangement, that would be equally positive and unequivocal in either language, and to call the process a necessary accommodation to the English idiom, is to delude the reader into a belief that your rendering is in no respect more than equivalent to the original. The authors of the common version seem to have been more scrupulous. They had before them the older versions, to which you appeal ; and had probably better grounds for not adopting them, than ignorance or prejudice. They were men of learning and integrity ; they might have been acquainted with *all* the limitations of your rule ; and must evidently have thought, that the older versions had said more than they had right to say. The very circumstance of their having such versions to guide them, is in favour of their authority, if an appeal must be made to versions at all ; as it affords a fair presumption, that they had religiously considered the subject, before they ventured to give to the public a different rendering.

I place the whole of this discussion principally upon the footing of a defence of the common version ; and, I frankly acknowledge,

for the purpose of screening myself, if possible, from uncandid insinuations. To submit to any thing of the kind in silence might be injurious to my character ; and to be put upon the defending of *myself* would be painful to my feelings. Whatever public notice may be taken of this work, I hope and trust, will be confined to the arguments, and the philological observations, and the author left out of the question. It ought not to be represented as an invidious employment for a clergyman of the Church of England, to vindicate an authorised version, which he is bound to use in the discharge of his office, to appeal to in his public instructions, and which it is generally thought unadvised in a preacher to censure and correct from the pulpit. Had I been prompted to this investigation by no other motive than a wish to satisfy my conscience, and acquit myself of blame, for having persisted, as an individual, in keeping your candle under the bushel, where it has glimmered for centuries, unobserved, except through the spectacles of a few poring critics, I should be perfectly justified ; but I might, without affectation, ascribe this work to other motives, more impressive in themselves, and of more general interest.

Your interpretation exhibits the sacred penmen in unfavourable colours, irreconcilable with the uprightness and simplicity that characterize their writings. It represents them as varying from their constant practice, and rejecting a positive and unequivocal mode of expression, upon occasions, when such a mode must have forced itself upon their minds, from the inevitable effect of habit. You will grant, that in the first example, St. Paul would have accorded better with himself had he joined the attribute $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ to $\chi\rho\iota\varsigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ in the same manner as he does those of $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ or $\sigma\omega\tau\eta\rho$, and that by so doing he would have been as explicit, and have left as little occasion for doubt, in the one case as in the other. For my own part, I do not perceive the least ambiguity in either case. But upon your hypothesis, he has varied from himself, and thereby has perplexed and obscured his meaning ; and for what conceivable end ? Was an explicit declaration one of those things that were lawful indeed, but not expedient ? Was he afraid, by two bluntly disclosing a sublime and astonishing mystery, of offending the prejudices of the Jews, or alarming the wisdom of the Greeks ? He was all things to all men, and fed his recent converts to Christianity with milk ; but he would not descend to a disingenuous artifice, a kind of pious fraud, to promote the honour of his divine Master. But you will say, his words do clearly, and without any obscurity or ambiguity,

express the sense you ascribe to them. Let this be proved from principles of impartial and liberal criticism with respect to any of the texts, and every syllable of this censure shall be cheerfully retracted. I do not mean, that St. Paul, when teaching the divinity of our Lord, was obliged by the law of probity, to assert the doctrine in every or any instance, in direct terms, rather than by necessary consequence ; but I do say, that whenever he intended to assert it *totidem verbis*, he would not obscure his language by a redundancy, which he never admits in any parallel instance.

Upon a comprehensive view of the subject, the conduct of your whole tract seems exposed to the charge of indiscretion ; and still more does the tone of exultation with which it has been received and applauded by your abettors. Your work has been held up in terms of defiance, as bringing to light the most decisive argument that ever was directed against the apostacy of Socinus ; one which our adversaries can neither gainsay nor resist. Never, it is said, was his school attacked with so formidable a weapon. Thus, the old grounds, to which you must, at last, return, and where alone you can safely take your stand, are incautiously depreciated and degraded. Should your remarks prove at last to be fallacious, the termination of this temporary triumph may be eagerly received by the adversary as a final concession, and turned upon you, perhaps, in the true spirit of party zeal. You may have reason, therefore, to be satisfied that they are confuted, if indeed they have been, by one who is no Socinian ; and who thinks there are much more cogent arguments in reserve, when your rule of interpretation shall be abandoned. Had you succeeded in proving to a demonstration that the noun *Θεός* was unequivocally applied to Christ, in a dozen of places of scripture, the Socinian would retreat under cover of an inferior sense. It is well for our cause that we can pursue him with arguments, which, in a simple and honest mind, admit neither of strivings about words, nor dividing about a name. There is more real, because more practical consequence, in the plain and indisputable fact, that grace, mercy, and peace are invoked from the Lord Jesus Christ in conjunction with God the Father, than in a hundred grammatical or metaphysical subtleties.

There is as much zeal as circumspection, in the laborious researches of your learned correspondent, when he endeavours to prove not by express testimony, but by analogy, that all the texts, which we have been discussing, were uniformly understood, as you understand them, from the times of the Apostles. I think it fortunate

that this can neither be demonstrated, nor even rendered probable. If it could, it might give occasion to the adversary to insinuate, that a misunderstanding of the scriptures, easily traced to its source in the prevailing idiom of the language, was coeval with the earliest direct and positive assertions of our Lord's divinity. It cannot therefore, be disagreeable to you, though it may be unnecessary, to be told that this doctrine was received, and directly asserted, in the Greek churches, long before these texts were called to its support, either directly, by way of appeal, (which indeed is not the practice of the earliest writers,) or indirectly, by way of allusion, adoption, or imitation. Hence it may be presumed that the doctrine then rested on other grounds.

I have nothing farther to add to these remarks than to recommend them to your serious consideration ; and to request that nothing contained in them may be considered as wilfully disrespectful towards yourself, or the learned editor of your former editions. His character has long stood high for extensive erudition directed to the best of purposes ; and I understand, that you are deservedly esteemed as a gentleman and a Christian. Of your talents and scholarship the evidence is before the public. But when an election is to be made between personal respect, or a deference to authority, and a veneration for truth, the preponderance of obligation is manifest, and the decision ought to be immediate.

Ἀμφοῖν γὰρ οὐτοῖν φίλοι, ὅστιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀληθείαν.

I am, Sir, with thanks for alluring me to an examination, which perhaps I should otherwise never have thought of,

Yours, -

C. Winstanley.

By Mr Norton

APPENDIX

TO THE AMERICAN EDITION.

THE first of Mr. Sharp's rules respecting the article has been stated by Bishop Middleton in a somewhat different form, and defended by him in his 'Doctrine of the Greek Article.' His language in the statement of the rule and its limitations has reference to the peculiarities of his own theory respecting the article. In the following account of what he says, where expressions occur in his work, which are not to be understood without a knowledge of his theory, equivalent and more common terms have been substituted for them.

His rule is, "When two or more attributives, joined by a copulative or copulatives, relate to the same person or thing, before the first attributive the article is inserted, before the remaining ones it is omitted." p. 44. *Amer. Ed.*

By attributives he understands adjectives, participles, and nouns which are significant of character, relation and dignity.

There is no similar rule with regard to "names of substances considered as substances." Thus we may say *ὁ λίθος καὶ χεῦρος*, without repeating the article before *χεῦρος*, though we speak of two different substances. The reason of this limitation of the rule is stated to be that "distinct real essences cannot be conceived to belong to the same thing;" or in other words, that the same thing cannot be supposed to be two different substances.—In this case then it appears that the article is not repeated, because its repetition is not necessary to prevent ambiguity. This is the true principle which accounts for all the limitations and exceptions to the rule which are stated by Bishop Middleton and others. It is mentioned thus early, that the principle may be kept in mind; and its truth may be remarked in the other cases of limitation or of exception to be quoted.

No similar rule applies to proper names. "The reason," says Middleton, "is evident at once; for it is impossible that *John* and *Thomas*, the names of two distinct persons, should be predicated of an individual." p. 48. This remark is not to the purpose; for the same individual may have two names. The true reason for this limitation is, that proper names, when those of the same individual, are not connected by a copulative or copulatives, and therefore that when they are thus connected no ambiguity arises from the omission of the article.

"Nouns," says Middleton, "which are the names of abstract ideas, are also excluded; for as Locke has well observed, 'Every distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence, and the names which stand for such distinct ideas are the names of things essentially different.'" *Ibid.* It would therefore, he reasons, be contradictory to suppose

that any quality were at once *απειρία* and *απαίδευσις*. But the names of abstract ideas, it may be observed, are used to denote personal qualities, and the same personal qualities, as they are viewed under different aspects, may be denoted by different names. The reason assigned by Middleton is therefore without force. The true reason for the limitation is, that *usually* no ambiguity arises from the omission of the article before words of the class mentioned.

The rule, it is further conceded, is not of universal application, as it respects *Plurals*; for, says Middleton, "Though *one* individual may act, and frequently does act, in several capacities, it is not likely that a *multitude* of individuals should all of them act in the *same* several capacities: and, by the extreme improbability that they should be represented as so acting, we may be forbidden to understand the second Plural Attributive of the persons designed in the Article prefixed to the first, however the usage in the Singular might seem to countenance the construction." p. 50.

Lastly, "we find," he says, "in very many instances, not only in the plural, but even in the singular number, that where attributives are in their nature *absolutely incompatible*, i. e. where the application of the rule would involve a contradiction in terms, there the first attributive only has the article, *the perspicuity of the passage not requiring the rule to be accurately observed*." p. 51.

Having thus laid down the rule with its limitations and exceptions, Bishop Middleton applies it to some of the passages in the New Testament adduced by Mr. Sharp in proof of the divinity of Christ. These were Acts xx, 28. (supposing the true reading to be *του κυριου και Θεου*) Ephes. v, 5. 2 Thess. i, 12. 1 Tim. v, 21. (if *κυριου* should be retained in the text) 2 Tim. iv, 1. (if we read *του Θεου και κυριου*) Titus ii, 3. 2 Peter i, 1. Jude 4. (supposing *Θεου* to belong to the text.) In four of these eight texts, the reading adopted to bring them within the rule is probably spurious, as may be seen by referring to Griesbach; and they are in consequence either given up, or not strongly insisted upon, by Middleton. In one of the remaining, 2 Thess. i, 12, the reading is *κατα την χάριν του Θεου ημων και κυριου Ιησου Χριστου*. Of this Middleton is "disposed to think that it affords no certain evidence in favor of Mr. Sharp," because he "believes that *κυριος* in the form of *Κυριος Ιησους Χριστος* became as a title so incorporated with the proper name as to be subject to the same law." p. 305. The three remaining texts are those on which he principally relies.

By the application of the rule to the passages last mentioned, it is inferred that Christ is called God, and the great God; and it is affirmed that the rule requires us to understand these titles as applied to him. The general answer to this reasoning is as follows.

It appears by comparing the rule with its exceptions and limitations, that it, in fact, amounts to nothing more than this: that when substantives, adjectives, or participles are connected together by a copulative or copulatives, if the first have the article, it is to be *omitted* before those which follow when they relate to the same person or thing; and is to be *inserted* when they relate to different persons or thing, EXCEPT when this fact is sufficiently determined by some other circumstance.

The principle of exception just stated is evidently that which runs through all the limitations and exceptions which Middleton has laid down and exemplified, and is in itself perfectly reasonable. When, from any other circumstance, it may be clearly understood that different persons or things are spoken of, then the insertion or omission of the article is a matter of indifference.

But if this is true, no argument for the divinity of Christ can be drawn from the texts adduced. With regard to this doctrine, the main question is, whether it was taught by Christ and his apostles, and received by the early Christians. Unitarians maintain that it was not; and consequently maintain that no thought of it was ever entertained by the apostles and first believers. But if this supposition is correct, the insertion of the article in these texts was wholly unnecessary. No ambiguity could result from its omission. It was perfectly evident from other sources that two distinct persons were spoken of. The imagination had never entered the minds of men that God and Christ were the same person. The apostles in writing and their converts in reading the passages in question, could have no more conception of one person only being understood, in consequence of the omission of the article, than of supposing but one substance to be meant by the terms *ὁ λίθος καὶ χρυσός*, on account of the omission of the article before *χρυσός*. These texts therefore cannot be brought to disprove the Unitarian supposition, because this supposition must first be proved false, before these texts can be taken from the exception and brought under the operation of the rule. The truth of the supposition accounts for the omission of the article.

This, it is conceived, is the general answer to the argument founded upon these texts. Other objections to this argument of much force are stated in the preceding tract.

Bishop Middleton's work was reviewed quite at length in the *Monthly Review* (vol. 62 for 1810) with much ability and learning, though perhaps with a little too much levity of manner; and though some points, it may be thought, are too hardly pressed. But the article should be read by all who are disposed to receive upon his authority the canons which he has laid down. It has been thought worth while to give in this appendix those parts of the review, which relate particularly to the subject treated of in the present pamphlet. The original references to the pages of the English edition of his work are altered to correspond with those of the American edition.

“When *attributives* (that is, as Dr. M. understands the term, when adjectives and participles of any sort, or such substantives as are significant of *character, relation, or dignity*,* joined together by copulatives,) are meant as descriptions of the same person or thing,

* Such as *Ἰός, ῥήτωρ, ἡγεμὼν, δούλος, δεσποτὴς*, &c. ‘Such nouns,’ says Dr. M. (so at least they are denominated,) differ little in their nature from adjectives; they are *adjectives of invariable application*, being constantly used to mark some *attribute* of the substance *ανθρώπος*, which is in all of them understood.’

the article is *inserted* before the first, but *omitted* before the others. For example; *ῥωσκιος ὁ υἱος καὶ κληρονομος του τεθνηκοτος ηγνανακτι.* Plut. Vit. Cic. ed. Bast. p. 68.

"Of the limitations to this canon, or rule, we may perhaps speak hereafter: but we must now observe that, as Dr. M. has laid them down, they are such as utterly exclude all application of the rule to the proof of our Saviour's divinity. The Son cannot be proved, by this rule, to be 'of one *substance, essence, or nature*, with the Father,' unless the word *θεος*, in those texts to which the rule is applied, denote *substance, essence, or nature*:—but, by his first and third limitations, the Doctor says that, whenever a noun denotes any of these things, the rule becomes inapplicable. He farther says (p. 46.) that 'all nouns are excluded' from the rule, 'except those which are significant of character.' If so, *θεος*, whenever it is subject to the rule, can signify nothing more than a divine character: but a divine character is no more than what every Christian is repeatedly required, by various precepts in the New Testament, to assume.

"We think that the Doctor's remarks on proper names and abstract nouns, with reference to this rule, are erroneous; and that what he says of them afterward, in his 4th and 5th chapters, which he has separately allotted to them, is trifling. Nay even that, in some parts,—especially where he talks about the article in Homer first keeping an awful distance from the proper name, and then approaching nearer and still more near, till at last they come into immediate contact, and about half and whole converts in Aristophanes,—it is open to ridicule. We see no reason for making any distinction between appellatives and other nouns, whether proper names or abstract nouns, with regard to the use of the article. They are all subject to one and the same law in this respect.

"When Dr. M. says (p. 48.), 'it is impossible that *John* and *Thomas*, the names of two distinct persons, should be predicated of an individual,' this is very true, as long as these names are considered as names of two distinct persons; and it is equally impossible that *υἱος καὶ κληρονομος*, or any of the Doctor's attributives, should be predicated of an individual whenever *they* are considered as attributives of two distinct persons:—but, if *John* and *Thomas* be only two distinct proper names, they may *then* be predicated of an individual as easily as *υἱος καὶ κληρονομος* can, *when* they are no more than two distinct attributives. How many men are called both *John* and *Thomas*? and is not a ship called *The William and Mary*? Surely we may assert of a man's conduct that it is at once both *απειρία* and *απαιδευσια*, without falling into that contradiction which the Doctor apprehends. (*Ibid*)" M. R. vol. lxii. pp. 81, 82.

* * *

"We shall here recur to Dr. M.'s canon about *attributives*, to which we have before promised farther attention. What the Doctor has laid down in that canon is the *converse* of Mr. Sharp's rule: but he stoutly contends, as far as words go, for the truth of the rule

itself, in p. 52 ; and he says, that it ‘prevails universally,’ that ‘we are *compelled* to acquiesce in it,’ (pp. 285, 297.) that if the sacred writers did not mean to apply it, in Tit. ii. 13, ‘to mislead must have been their object,’ (p. 286.) and he asks, ‘Where is the instance in which it has been violated?’ (p. 308.) We say he contends as far as *words* go, because, while he is thus *verbally* strenuous for the rigorous application of the rule, he, in *fact*, by a most unaccountable confusion of ideas, quite overthrows and destroys it. He thinks that some of Mr. Sharp’s texts ‘afford no certain evidence in his favour,’ p. 299 ; is ‘surprized at his having adduced them,’ p. 306 ; (see also p. 304.) says that ‘few of Mr. Wordsworth’s twenty-six examples appear to be much to the purpose,’ p. 298 ; that ‘the word *ἁγιος*, even during our Saviour’s lifetime, had become a proper name,’ p. 150 ; (see also p. 284.) that *ἁγιος* ‘so far partakes of the nature of proper names that it sometimes dispenses with the article where other words require it,’ p. 297 ; and that ‘the same, or nearly the same, is true of *θεός*,’ which word, however, though it makes ‘approaches, does not make such *near* approaches, to be a proper name,’ as the word *ἁγιος* does : but that both these words approach *so* near as to receive occasional shocks from their approaches, if they are not permanently affected by them ; and to derive from these shocks ‘a license, or privilege, of taking or rejecting the article indifferently, or indiscriminately, which license, or privilege, they sometimes do and sometimes do not use, or exercise ;’ (pp. 95. 159. 160. 230. 284.) for even *ἁγιος*, which approaches the nearest of the two, though ‘commonly subject to Mr. Sharp’s rule,’ is not subject to it in some of the texts which he has adduced, (such as 2 Thess. i. 12. 1 Tim. v. 21. and 2 Tim. iv. 1.) on account of its being a proper name, or part of, a proper name, and yet *may*, even when standing close to the proper name *Ἰησοῦς ἁγιος*, be so ‘disjoined and detached from it’ as to make no approach towards a proper name, but, on the contrary, be so perfectly appellative as to ‘be identified with a preceding attributive.’ Whether it is ‘commonly to be so separated from the proper name, in order to be joined with some preceding attributive,’ the Doctor ‘fears no proof can be obtained,’ p. 299 : though he ‘believes that *ἁγιος* in the form *ἁγιος Ἰησ. Χ.* became, as a title, so incorporated with the proper name, as to be subject to the same law.’ (p. 305.)

“Now as Mr. Sharp, by one of his limitations, has excluded proper names from his rule, Dr. Middleton, by his remarks concerning *ἁγιος*, *ἁγιος*, and *θεός*, and their approaches towards proper names, has rendered it very doubtful whether there be, if he has not made it clear that there is not, any word left in the New Testament to which Mr. Sharp can apply his rule, so as to make it support the theological tenet of our Saviour’s divinity, except the word *σῶτης*. Yet even that word, which, according to Dr. M. (p. 46.) must be an ‘adjective of invariable application,’ before Mr. Sharp’s rule can have any thing to do with it, and which may therefore (as he says in his note, p. 44.) ‘be interchanged with a participle,’ would, we think, have reason to complain of being unfairly treated, if it were

to be deprived of the privilege of approaching a proper name, or even of being incorporated with it, and of having a license, in virtue of such approach or incorporation, to take or reject the article indifferently, as well as its brethren; more especially as the Doctor says it may be considered as an adjective, and ought sometimes in strictness to be so rendered, (pp. 225. 309) and as we find not only *σωτων* (Matt. xxvii. 49) but even *σωτηρ* itself, in many passages of the New Testament, without the article. Though Dr. M. conceives that he has accounted for the absence of the article, by some reasoning (in p. 307.) of which we do not feel the cogency, we cannot, either with or without his assistance, see why *σωζων*, or *σωτηρ*, may not take or reject the article as readily as *αρχων*, (see the Doctor's note on Luke xi. 15. p. 177. compared with his note on Jude 25. p. 356.) or approach occasionally as near to a proper name as *παραζων*, or *βαπτίζων*, or as *βαπτιστης*, or any other attributive. The Doctor himself in p. 52. seems to put *θιος* and *σωτηρ* on the same footing; and when it suits his purpose, and supports his rules, he makes *υιος* (see his second note on 1 John ii. 22. p. 341.) and *ανθρωπος*, (note on 1 Tim. ii. 5. p. 303) and even *αικος*, (notes on Matth. xv. 24. p. 128. and on Acts ii. 36. p. 209.) and *κοσμος*, (note on Galat. vi. 14. p. 275.) nouns which are not even attributives, proper names and parts of titles; and he says (note on Jude 11. p. 356.) that *μυσθος*, we know not why, 'does not require the article.'

"Be this, however, as it may, we think that Mr. Sharp, who invented the rule, (we mean, so far as it respects its *absolute inviolability* within those limits which he prescribed to it,) has an undoubted right to determine for himself whether any example has, or has not, the conditions which he requires in order to make it subject to his rule. If, however, some of the texts to which he applies his rule have all his conditions, (which is implied by the application,) and yet do not, as Dr. M. contends, support the rule, they must overthrow it; for they shew that it is not an inviolable rule, even within those limits on which the inventor has fixed for the purpose of making it such.

"Another of Mr. Sharp's limitations, which excludes *plural* nouns from his rule, the Doctor would abrogate; because he thinks that the rule is applicable to *plurals* as well as to *singulars*, with this difference only, that 'though *one* individual may, and frequently does, act in several capacities, it is not likely that a *multitude* of individuals should all of them act in the *same* several capacities.' With the Doctor's leave, this makes no difference in the case, because plurality does not necessarily imply a multitude; and if it did, the improbability of that multitude acting in the same several capacities does not depend on the plurality of the persons, but on the singularity of the capacities in which they are required to act. To illustrate his position, Dr. M. has fixed on the capacities of a member of parliament and the colonel of a regiment; and in these capacities, no doubt, it is not very usual for a multitude to act: but suppose that he had fixed on the capacities of a man and a mortal, *ανθρωπος* and *θνητος*, as in Prov. iii. 13. the first of which may be an attributive,

and the latter, being an adjective, is the purest of attributives. (See Dr M p. 47.) In these capacities, every individual of his multitude, however large, must constantly act. Or suppose that he had fixed on any of the capacities mentioned in the first four of those examples by which he supports the rule, viz. *υἱος και κληρονομος*, or *λεγων και γραφων*, &c. in which it is as common to find a multitude acting as to find an individual; and therefore it is we suppose, that the Doctor has extended the rule to plurals, and that he says he has 'not observed that it is ever infringed in *such* instances.'

"The rest of Mr Sharp's limitations, viz. those by which he excludes nouns not personal, and proper names, from his rule, Dr. M. defends; dividing the former into two kinds, the names of substances considered as such, and the names of abstract ideas: but, in our opinion, his defence only serves to show the nakedness of the land. We always looked on these limitations as the worst and weakest part of the rule; because they appear to us to be not limitations *found*, but limitations *made*,—to have no existence in reality, either in *rerum* or in *verborum natura*—but to be wholly *factitious* and imaginary. Not that we believe Mr. Sharp to have been at all aware of his *making* them. He is too good and upright, by far, to think of imposing on *others*: but a man who has a system which he wishes to support, and who is urged to maintain it by the temptation of a discovery thrown in his way, is very apt to impose on *himself*; and a little friendly opposition from those about him will often render his wishes and his temptation more keen and seductive. Now Mr. Sharp, it appears from the date of the letter with which his publication opens, began to form his notion of the article as far back as the year 1778, though the first edition of that publication did not come out till 1798; and it appears also that during the twenty years which intervened, the subject had been canvassed and sifted in private: in which time, probably, the disputants on one side or the other would find *all* the examples any way bearing on the question, which were contained in the compass of a book no larger than the New Testament. Indeed, this seems to have been actually the case; for in his 'Dissertation' in reply to Mr. Winstanley's tract, Mr. Sharp says (p. 4) that the examples which are agreeable to his rule in the Greek Testament are 'twenty-five at least in number.' Mr. Sharp, therefore, would see that a very few limitations only were wanted to enable him to answer every objection which could be brought against him from the New Testament; and the temptation to *discover* that those limitations were real, and well founded, would be irresistible. To us, who are trained *by profession* not to believe without evidence, it appears that these limitations are groundless; and that the New Testament alone contains examples abundantly sufficient to show that Mr Sharp's rule does not *always* prevail. The only use of going beyond the New Testament for examples is to undeceive those who are *willing* to believe that, *within* the limits which Mr. Sharp has prescribed, the rule is infallible.

"Here we behold the strongest and the most deadly of all the blows which Dr. Middleton has given by facts, to a rule which he

supports by words : for he produces several instances of the violation of the rule with respect both to singulars and plurals. To those who adhere to the rule as Mr. Sharp laid it down, it is useless to point out instances of its violation in the case of plurals, because these persons do not extend it to such nouns, though Dr. M. does. We will therefore only bring forward one of his examples of this sort ; and that shall be the one which, in his opinion, pleads the strongest against extending the rule to plurals, which we select in order that our readers may see how the Doctor disposes of it, and why he would extend the rule to plurals in defiance of it. The example is this. *ἐν εὐμορφοῖς ΤΑΣ ἀμορφους· ΚΑΙ ἐμπηρους ἐξεδίδουσαν.* Herodot. lib. i. p. 15 : ‘where it may be said, that the *ἐμπηροι* must be supposed to be in general distinct from the *ἀμορφοί*, and that the author, though he has not prefixed the article to the second attributive, meant so to distinguish them.’ ‘Granting this to be the case, and that other less questionable instances may be found,’ the Doctor thinks that the rule may may still be extended to plurals ; first because, ‘in the course of a somewhat extensive examination, he has met with very few such instances ;’ and next because, ‘our observation having taught us that the *ἀμορφοί* are not usually *ἐμπηροι*, and *vice versâ*, we are not liable to understand these epithets of the same individual, any more than if the second of them had the article prefixed.’ This is not applying Mr. Sharp’s but a very different rule to plurals. His rule is so far from admitting a very few exceptions, that it does not allow of a single exception ; and it is so far from admitting of being set aside as often as any thing unusual would arise from adhering to it, that it will never allow of being set aside on any account whatever. Like the law of the Medes and Persians, (Dan vi. 8.) it altereth not.

“Of the examples which Dr. Middleton has produced to shew that Mr. Sharp’s rule does not *always* hold true, even with respect to singulars, we will lay the whole before our readers ; because these are more serviceable and necessary for persons who would *willingly* persuade themselves that some hidden and secret virtue resides in the limitations ; and we will give the precedence to those examples of which the Doctor seems to think it is the easiest to get rid, reserving the most refractory and untractable example to the last. *ἐν ὅσοις ὑπαρχεῖ το πρΟΤΕΡΟΝ καὶ ὕΣΤΕΡΟΝ*, Aristot. Eth. ad Eudem. lib. i. c. 8. *Περὶ του ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΥ τε καὶ ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΥ.* Arist. de Interp. cap. 12. *Μεταξὺ του ΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΟΣ τε καὶ ΠΑΣΧΟΝΤΟΣ.* Plato Theat. vol. ii. p. 134. *Το τ’ΑΥΤΟΝ καὶ ἕΤΕΡΟΝ.* Ibid. p. 142. *Του ΑΡΤΙΟΥ καὶ ΠΕΡΙΤΤΟΥ, του ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ καὶ ΑΔΙΚΟΥ.* Id. Gorg. vol. iv. p. 32.

“To save the rule from being destroyed by these examples, Dr. M. deems it sufficient to say that here the attributives ‘are in their nature absolutely incompatible, and such as cannot be predicated of the same subject without the most evident and direct contradiction :’ —but do not those against whom Mr. Sharp levelled his rule say that *θεός*, when taken literally, and understood to be significant of nature and essence, is far more incompatible with, and far more contradictory to, the other attributives in Ephes. v. 5. Tit. ii. 13.

2 Pet. i. 1. &c. when understood of Jesus, than any of the attributives in the foregoing examples are to each other? And were not the limitations *made* for the express purpose of overpowering and bearing down such carnal reasoning against the divinity of our Saviour? If the rule be not strong enough to do this, what is it worth?

“Now, if the foregoing examples were not sufficient to destroy the rule, how can it be saved from the following? *Των παλλακῶν τε μὴν αποπνιζάντις θάπτουσι, καὶ ΤΟΝ οἰνοχόον, ΚΑΙ μαγείρον, ΚΑΙ ἵππο-κομον, ΚΑΙ δῆκονον, ἀγγεληφόρον, ΚΑΙ ἵππους. ΚΑΙ, &c* Herodot. ed. Steph lib. iv. p. 154. What does Dr. Middleton say in order to get rid of this? Why, he says (p. 51 Note.) in the first place that, not having Wesseling’s edition at hand, he cannot ascertain whether this be the reading of the MSS: but we have looked at Wesseling, (p. 313. line 14.) and find no variation.—Secondly, he says ‘it is impossible that *all* these various offices should have been united in the same person; and this obvious impossibility may be the reason, that the writer has expressed himself so negligently:’—but what the Doctor here calls an impossibility amounts, at the most, to no more than an improbability; and not of the highest kind. All our readers know that *Scrub*, in the Beaux Stratagem, had a different office for every day in the week; and many a *Scrub*, in this grasping world of ours, is as great a monopolizer of offices. Surely, Dr. M. can never consider it as equally improbable that the same person should exercise five different offices as that the same person should be God and man! He can never think that, if the rule does not *compel* the reader to understand the nouns in the passage of Herodotus as being descriptive of one person, it can *compel* him to understand Ephes. v 5. Tit. ii. 13. 2 Pet. i 1. and those other texts to which it is applied by Mr. Sharp or himself, as being *such* descriptions of one person as those for which they contend.—Thirdly, he says, ‘he once thought that *μαγείρον, ἵπποκομον, &c.* might signify *one* of every kind.’ This notion he has abandoned: but suppose it to be admitted, would it do any thing towards making the nouns more descriptive of the same person, or towards supplying the articles which are omitted?—Fourthly, he says, he does ‘not recollect any similar example:’—but this one example, alone, is quite sufficient to deprive the rule of all pretensions to that compulsive power which the limitations were designed to infuse into it, and to sink it down to the old level at which it stood before Mr. Sharp began to meddle with it. At this level, Glass, among other writers, has placed it, who lays it down in his *Philologia Sacra* as a rule which prevails ‘*quandoque* ;’ who, being as orthodox as any man could wish, applies it to Ephes. v 5. Tit. ii. 13. 2 Pet. i. 1. and Jude 4, as many had done before him, but says at the same time, ‘*addendum tamen, non esse καὶ τοῦτον hanc observationem* ;’ and who, after having produced from the New Testament some examples in which the rule is violated, adds; ‘*ex quo patet, dubia et infirma sæpe esse, quæ ex articulorum emphasi desumuntur argumenta pro articulis fidei comprobandis.*’ (Vol. i. p. 135, 236. ex edit. Dathii. 8vo. Lips. 1726.)—Lastly, the Doctor

says, 'it has subsequently occurred to him, that the several nouns *μαγιστον, ιπποκομον, &c.* may want the article by' what he calls '*Enumeration.*' What power this has to extricate any passage from the operation of Mr. Sharp's rule, we cannot see: but we can see that it is just as easy for Unitarians to call the disputed texts (Ephes. v. 5. Tit. ii. 13. &c.) *enumeration*, as it is for the Doctor to call this passage of Herodotus by that name. Whether there be any thing more in the term than a mere name, our readers will have an opportunity of determining for themselves when we come to speak of the Doctor's anomalies, of which enumeration makes one, and of which we will lay his description before them.

"Several examples subversive of Mr. Sharp's rule were produced by those who professedly opposed it, especially by Mr. Winstanley. This we anticipated: but who would have expected that the examples which we have quoted in this note should be found in an author who after having brought them forward, asks 'where is the instance in which the rule has been violated?' This is such an extraordinary instance of *learning* deceiving itself, that we conceived it to be our duty, equally to the public and the author, to go into it more at length than we should have done in any common case, in order that we might dispel the cloud and exhibit the truth. For the same purpose, we will add an example or two of our own, which have fallen in our way. 'Ο Πλατων φησιν ευδαιμονα και μακαριαν ειναι πολιν εν η ΤΟ ερον ΚΑΙ ουκ ερον' ημισα φθιγγομενων ακουουσι. Plut. Præcept. Conjug. vol i. p. 243. edit. Steph. 8vo. 1572. Ειδεναι ΤΟ τε οσον ΚΑΙ μη. Plato Euthyphr. vol. i. p. 15. E. edit Steph. 1578. and immediately afterwad, ΤΑ τε οσια ΚΑΙ μη, in the plural. Diog. e. s Laertius, having divided some of Plato's dialogues into two kinds θεωρηματικος τε και πρακτικος, again subdivides each of these, ο μιν θεωρηματικος εις ΤΟΝ φυσικον ΚΑΙ λογικον' ο δε πρακτικος εις ΤΟΝ ηθικον ΚΑΙ πολιτικον. Lib. iii p. 192. vol i. edit. 4to. Meibomii Amst. 1692. Του δε ζητητικου και αυτου δυο εισιν οι πρωτοι χαρακτηρες, 'Ο τε γυμνασικος ΚΑΙ αγωνιστικος. Id. ibid.

"We are rather surprised that none of the disputants, for or against Mr. Sharp's rule, should have adverted to a passage in Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, vol. ii pp. 52—57. in which he says expressly, p. 56, that 'when the definite article is prefixed to the first adjective, it ought to be repeated before the second, if the adjectives are expressive of qualities belonging to different subjects; but not if they refer to the same subject.' Yet the Doctor himself has violated the latter part of his rule. (if he meant to include Dr. Middleton's 'adjectives of invariable application' under the rule, which from what he says in p. 56, we think he did,) by repeating the article where the person is the same; and that too when he is correcting a faulty expression of another writer, and may therefore be supposed to be more than usually attentive to his own language: for in page 39, line last, he says; 'Solomon *the* son of David, and *the* builder of the temple.' So liable are rules of this sort to be broken through!—but perhaps the Doctor might not allow this to be any breach. He can, possibly, account for insertion here as easily

and as satisfactorily as he does for omission before. In a similar case of insertion, (John xiii. 13.) he tells us that ‘though both titles ὁ διδασκαλος καὶ ὁ κυριος are meant to be applied to our Saviour, yet they are not spoken of as being applied *at the same time*!’—See John xx. 28. ὁ κυριος μου καὶ ὁ θεος μου. See also the Doctor’s note on 2 John 7. p. 354.

“In Mr Lindley Murray’s Grammar, also, are some remarks illustrative of this use of the article. (See his Syntax, rule 21. p. 300. edit. 8vo. 1808.) Dr. Middleton, indeed, seems to think that little analogy or resemblance, prevails between the Greek and the modern languages, with respect to the use of the article; and that such arguments as have been founded by Dr. Campbell and others on that analogy are inconclusive. (pp. 4. 209 285.) He is, however, quite singular in this opinion, since scarcely a modern scholar can be found who has written on the Greek article without expressly noticing the great resemblance between it and the article in modern languages. Harris says; ‘though the Greeks have no article correspondent to the article *A*, yet nothing can be more nearly related than their *O* to the article *The*. Nor is this only to be proved by parallel examples, but by the attributes of the Greek article, as they are described by Apollonius, one of the earliest and most acute of the old grammarians now remaining.’ (p. 219 edit. 1771. 8vo.) The German Reviewers of *Kluit’s* tract on the Greek article inform us that he treats ‘*de similitudine, quæ in usu articuli hujus, inter linguam Græcam et Belgicam, omninoque linguas septentrionis, intercedit.*’ (Nov. Act. Eruditorum, for July 1769, p. 327) Schleusner, in his Lexic. Nov. Test. sets out with noticing the similarity between the Greek and the German article. The French grammarians, Lancelot (in his Gr. Gram. better known by the name of the Port Royal Grammar,) Du Marsais, (in the *Encyclopedie*, vol. i. edit. 1751. fol.) and Beauzée (in his *Gram. Générale*,) all point out the similitude; and in short it might just as well be said that the noun or the verb, is a different part of speech in Greek from what it is in any modern language, as to say, with Dr. M., that the article is a different part of speech.” M. R. vol. lxii. pp. 151—159.

Since the publication of Bishop Middleton’s work, another has appeared on the same subject written by the Rev. Daniel Veysie, B. D. entitled, *On the Greek prepositive article, its nature and uses, A Grammatical Dissertation.* A review of it may be found in the Monthly Review, vol. lxxvii, 1812.

ERRATA.

Page	4.	line	18.	for	ενωσις	read	ένωσις.
				and for	ενουμένων	"	ένουμένων.
"	5.	"	5.	for	εξει	"	ένξει.
"	6.	"	11. from bottom,	for	παρονομια	"	παρανομια.
"	17.	"	17.	for	Epist.	"	Epit.





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